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DOUBLE JEOPARDY AS A LIMIT
ON PUNISHMENT
Carissa Byrne Hessickt & F. Andrew Hessicktt
One of the most common reasons for a sentencing enhancement is that
the defendant has a prior conviction. Courts have rejected claims that these
recidivism enhancements violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.
They have explained that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the
legislature from authorizing multiple punishments for one offense and that,
in any event, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply at sentencing. This
Article challenges these conclusions. It demonstrates that the central motiva-
tion for the Double Jeopardy Clause is the prohibition against multiple pun-
ishments and that allowing recidivism enhancements undermines this
protection. The Article further explains that the reasons courts give in re-
jecting double jeopardy challenges to recidivism enhancements directly con-
flict with courts' reasons for rejecting Eighth Amendment challenges to those
same enhancements. The consequence is an inconsistent body of law that
maximizes the government's ability to punish at the expense of individual
rights. The Article offers several reasons why the Double Jeopardy Clause is
the appropriate constitutional provision to limit recidivism enhancements
and sketches a framework under which jurisdictions may increase sentences
for recidivists under some circumstances, while at the same time providing
meaningful constitutional review of such sentences.
INTRODUCTION
Although criminal punishment is a hotly contested issue,' there is
one punishment issue on which virtually everyone seems to agree: re-
t Professor of Law, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University;
J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Columbia University.
tt Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development, Sandra
Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A.,
Dartmouth College. We want to thank Kelli Alces, Miriam Baer, Teneille Brown, Aaron
Bruhl, Jack Chin, Linda Demaine, Dave Fagundes, Aaron Fellmeth, Mary Anne Franks,
David Gartner, Paul Horwitz, Zak Kramer, Justin Marceau, Dan Markel,Jeffrie Murphy,Jon
Rose, Mary Sigler, Michael Sousa, Judy Stinson, and Doug Sylvester for their helpful com-
ments on this project. Thanks also to the participants at the Prawfsfest! Faculty Workshop,
the Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars Conference at the University of Utah SJ. Quinney
College of Law, as well as participants in faculty workshops at Emory University School of
Law, University of Iowa College of Law, and University of Texas School of Law. Beth DeFe-
lice and April Sanchez provided valuable research assistance.
I Although there is a burgeoning literature showing widespread agreement about
how to rank various crimes in relation to one another, see, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Robert
Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions ofJustice, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1829, 1892 (2007),
agreement about how much to punish (in absolute terms) does not appear to exist, see
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peat offenders ought to serve longer sentences than first-time offend-
ers. This Article challenges that conventional wisdom. Increasing a
defendant's punishment based on a previous conviction-a convic-
tion for which the defendant has already served a sentence-consti-
tutes a second punishment for the first crime of conviction.
Consequently, that increase conflicts with the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Put simply, the common practice of sentencing recidivists
more harshly ought to be, if not absolutely prohibited, at least limited
by the Constitution.
Historically, the right against double jeopardy was understood to
prohibit both multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the
same crime. 2 Over time, this view of double jeopardy has been
eclipsed by a narrower vision of the right concerned primarily with
prohibiting multiple prosecutions. Under current doctrine, the pro-
hibition on multiple punishments places no limits on a legislature's
ability to authorize multiple punishments for a single offense. 3 More-
over, courts have held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply
at sentencing 4-the stage in a criminal prosecution when a defen-
dant's precise punishment is determined. This modern shift away
from double jeopardy as a limit on punishment has rendered the
Double Jeopardy Clause unintelligible and eviscerated its theoretical
foundations.
Imposing lengthier sentences on recidivists is the most visible ex-
ample of the modern disregard for the prohibition against multiple
punishments. Every state legislature as well as Congress has enacted
statutes providing at least some form of increased punishment for
those who have previously been convicted of a crime. 5 And even
when not required to do so by statute, judges routinely enhance
sentences based on defendants' prior convictions. 6 Often-as with
California's "Three Strikes Law" 7 -the incremental increase in pun-
ishment can be quite severe. While commentators have occasionally
expressed concern over the length of the additional punishment im-
Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & David Hoffman, Some Realism About Punishment Natural-
ism, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 1531, 1544-45 (2010).
2 See North Carolina v, Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment
guarantee against double jeopardy ... protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction .... tand] protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense.").
3 See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312-13 (1901).
4 See, e.g., Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998).
5 Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1992); U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, No. NCJ-129896,
STATUTES REQUIRING THE USE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION (1991) [herein-
after STATUTES REQUIRING CRIMINAL HISTORY]; see infra notes 58-64.
6 See infra note 65.
7 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); Ewing v. California,
538 U.S. 11, 14-17 (2003) (explaining the law's purposes and specific provisions).
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posed on recidivists or whether such additional punishment is entirely
consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause,8 most have assumed the
general propriety of increasing sentences based on prior convictions.9
This Article argues that the right against double jeopardy ought
to limit the government's ability to increase punishments for recidi-
vists. At the core of the prohibition on double jeopardy is a limitation
on the government's ability to impose repeated punishment against
one individual for a single offense. The proliferation of recidivism
enhancements undermines that basic premise. Nor have other consti-
tutional rights filled the gap left by the courts' overly narrow construc-
tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause. To the contrary, defendants have
repeatedly challenged recidivism enhancements on a number of con-
stitutional grounds-including the Eighth Amendment prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment1 ° and the Sixth Amendment right
to ajury trial 1 -but courts have rejected those challenges without sat-
isfactoryjustifications. Indeed, the Supreme Court's explanations for
why recidivism enhancements do not violate the Eighth Amendment
directly conflict with the Court's explanations for why those same en-
hancements comport with the Double Jeopardy Clause. Through
these decisions, the courts have abdicated their role in enforcing con-
stitutional limits on punishment.
That the courts are failing to enforce any meaningful limits on
the state's ability to incarcerate past offenders is especially troubling
given the drastic increase in American prison populations over the last
few decades. 12 As more people are convicted, more individuals be-
come subject to recidivism enhancements, and the government gains
8 See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights
at Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 47, 58 n.50 (2011); Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A
Relational Account, 87 TEX. L. REV. 571, 575 n.12 (2009); Nathan H. Seltzer, When the Tail
Wags the Dog: The Collision Course Between Recidivism Statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 83
B.U. L. REV. 921, 932 (2003); Ahmed A. White, The Juridical Structure of Habitual Offender
Laws and the Jurisprudence of Authoritarian Social Control, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 705, 737-43
(2006).
9 See, e.g., GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 228
(1998); Susan R. Klein & Katherine P. Chiarello, Successive Prosecutions and Compound Crimi-
nal Statutes: A Functional Test, 77 TEX. L. REV. 333, 373-74 (1998); Elizabeth T. Lear, Double
Jeopardy, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the Subsequent-Prosecution Dilemma, 60 BROOK. L.
REv. 725, 741-48 (1994); Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: Cut-
ting the Gordian Knot, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 595, 597 (2006); Julian V. Roberts, The Role of
Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME &JUST. 303, 316-20 (1997); Seltzer, supra
note 8, at 936; Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for Habitual
or Dangerous Criminals, 89 HARv. L. RFv. 356, 361 (1975).
10 E.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25.
11 E.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998).
12 See, e.g.,John F. Pfaff, The Durability of Prison Populations, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73,
73 (noting that since the 1970s, the U.S. prison population "has quintupled in size, from
just over 300 thousand inmates to more than 1.5 million").
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more power to impose punishment without any real constitutional
limitations.
This Article presents a new framework for discussing constitu-
tional limits on punishment for recidivists. It identifies the historical
prohibition against multiple punishments embodied in the Double
Jeopardy Clause and criticizes the modern shift in interpreting the
Double Jeopardy Clause as primarily a prohibition on multiple prose-
cutions rather than also as a robust prohibition on multiple punish-
ments. The Article argues that interpreting the Double Jeopardy
Clause as essentially protecting against only multiple prosecutions ren-
ders the Clause unintelligible because, even if the Clause were only
intended to protect individuals from multiple prosecutions, that pro-
tection would be incomplete and inadequate if it did not also protect
against multiple punishments. This Article also explains how the in-
tersection of the Court's decisions regarding the Double Jeopardy
Clause and the Eighth Amendment results in a lack of any constitu-
tional limitation on punishment for recidivists. It also clarifies how
double jeopardy's limit on multiple punishments can be enforced in a
way that accommodates the state's interest in reducing crime while at
the same time providing a substantive limit on punishment.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the histori-
cal pedigree of the right against multiple punishments and the cur-
rent state of the law. Part II critiques the modern view of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. It not only demonstrates how the Double Jeopardy
Clause's limitation on multiple prosecutions is meaningless without a
corresponding limit on multiple punishments, but it also illustrates
the flaws in the courts' modern double jeopardy cases.
Part III explores the concept of constitutional limits on punish-
ment. Both the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Eighth Amendment
cabin the government's ability to punish, yet recent cases have cur-
tailed these limitations. Instead of striving to protect individual rights
through these doctrines, courts have focused on ensuring legislatures
maximum latitude in designing punishments. In their efforts to do
so, the courts have abandoned any pretense of logic or consistency.
They have rejected double jeopardy challenges on the ground that
recidivism enhancements do not punish for past offenses while at the
same time rejecting Eighth Amendment challenges to those same re-
cidivism enhancements on the ground that they do punish for past
offenses. Although courts could limit recidivism enhancements
through the Eighth Amendment, Part III explains why the Double
Jeopardy Clause's prohibition on multiple punishments is best suited
to serve as the constitutional limit on harsh sentencing practices
aimed at recidivists.
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I
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that "nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb. ' 13 Although the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
explicitly protect against multiple punishments, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized that the Clause does provide such protec-
tion. The Court has explained that the Clause consists of three sepa-
rate constitutional protections: "It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it pro-
tects against multiple punishments for the same offense."'1 4 As ex-
plained below, the protection against multiple punishments has a
long, though not entirely consistent, historical pedigree. But despite
its occasional statements that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
against multiple punishments, the Court has repeatedly failed to place
any meaningful limitations on a legislature's ability to punish an indi-
vidual multiple times for the same offense. In particular, the Court
has repeatedly allowed the imposition of higher punishment on those
offenders who have previously been convicted of a crime.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted), quoted in
Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994), Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984),
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980), and Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165
(1977); see also Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 793 (1994)
(" [T] he double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second
time to punish criminally, for the same offense." (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S.
391, 399 (1938))) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Schiro, 510 U.S. at 229 (noting that the
DoubleJeopardy Clause's protections "stem from the underlying premise that a defendant
should not be twice tried or punished for the same offense");Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v.
Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1984) ("Our cases have recognized three separate guaran-
tees embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause: It protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense."); Note, Twice in Jeop-
ardy, 75 YALE LJ. 262, 265-66 (1965) ("Three rules are central to the double jeopardy
prohibition: the rules which bar retrial for the same offense after acquittal, retrial for the
same offense after conviction, and multiple punishment for the same offense at one trial."
(footnotes omitted)).
Not all judges think that the right against multiple punishments derives from the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Some have said that the right is protected by the Due Process
Clause. See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 800 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that any
restriction on "multiple punishments ... derive[s] exclusively from the due process re-
quirement of legislative authorization").
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A. Historical Pedigree of Freedom from Multiple Punishments
The prohibition on multiple punishments has deep historical
roots. Ancient Athenian, 15 Jewish,
16 Roman, 17 and ecclesiastical law1
8
all contain some limitation on the imposition of multiple punish-
ments. In England, although the right was not recognized in earliest
days, 19 common-law courts developed increasing protection against
multiple punishments over time. For example in the 1610 decision
Dr. Bonham's Case, Chief Justice Coke concluded that it was inappro-
priate to punish a person for the unlicensed practice of medicine
both under one statute that punished a person who unlawfully prac-
ticed for one month and under another provision that punished the
unlicensed practice for any amount of time.20 He explained that
"[n] emo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto"21-"no one should be punished
twice for the same offence." Blackstone repeated the sentiment in his
Commentaries published in the 1760s. 22 Likewise, William Hawkins,
in his Pleas of the Crown, published in 1716, stated the principle: "the
Party ought not to be brought twice into Danger of his Life for the
15 See I JOHN POTrER, ARCHAEOLOGIAE GRAECAE: OR, THE ANTIQUITIES OF GREECE 153
(1697) ("[T]here shall be no renewing of any thing dispatcht by judges either in the pub-
lick, or more private Courts, or by the People, according to the Enactions of their
Decrees . . ").
16 S. MENDELSOHN, THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ANCIENT HEBREWS 178
(1890).
17 David S. Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double
Jeopardy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193, 198-200 (2005).
18 JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY
3 (1969); see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 (1959) (Black,J., dissenting) ("[T]he
idea that one trial and one punishment were enough remained alive through the canon
law and the teachings of the early Christian writers.").
19 Neither the Magna Carta nor the English Bill of Rights codified double jeopardy.
Instead, the right was judicially created. The first mention of a prohibition on a second
prosecution for the same offence was in 1201. See Rudstein, supra note 17, at 202-03; see
also 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 397 (George E. Woodbine ed.,
Samuel Thorne trans., 1968) (1235) (stating that an individual may "except against the
appeal" on the ground that "he had earlier been appealed of the same deed by another
and had departed quit by judgment").
20 Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (KB.) 654. Other historical sources
prohibited multiple punishments for the same offense. For example, under Hebrew law, a
person could not be both flogged and fined for the same offense. See MENDELSOHN, supra
note 16, at 178.
Modern laws regularly prescribe multiple components to a single punishment for a
single conviction. For example, a conviction for mortgage fraud can result in both a fine
of up to $1,000,000 and a term of imprisonment of up to thirty years. 18 U.S.C. § 1014
(2006).
21 See Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 654; accord 4 EDWARD COKE, THE REPORTS OF
SIR EDWARD CORE, IN THIRTEEN PARTS, pt. 7, at 377 (John Farquhar Fraser ed., 1826); see
also 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 141 (James Brown
Scott ed., C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1688).
22 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *311 ("[N]emo bis punitur pro eodem
delicto." (emphasis omitted)).
20111 DOUBLE JEOPARDY AS A LIMIT ON PUNISHMENT 51
[s]ame Crime."23 This restriction on multiple punishments was em-
bodied in the plea of autrefois convict, which could be raised by a de-
fendant who had already been convicted.2 4 A defendant who had
previously been acquitted could raise the plea of autrefois acquit against
subsequent prosecutions.
25
Early American law similarly recognized the prohibition on multi-
ple punishments. The Massachusetts Bay Colony enacted the Body of
Liberties in 1641, which provided that "[n]o man shall be twise sen-
tenced by Civill Justice for one and the same Crime, offence, or
Trespasse."2 6 In 1652, Connecticut adopted a similar provision, which
stated that "no Person shall be twice sentenced by Civil Justice for one
and the same Crime."2 7 Although other colonies did not adopt simi-
lar restrictions, courts in those colonies allowed defendants facing
multiple prosecutions to plead autrefois acquit or autrefois convict.
28
The Founders also expressed concern over the imposition of mul-
tiple punishments. The original language of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, as proposed by James Madison, provided that "[n] o person
shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one
punishment or one trial for the same offence." 29 Although several
members of the House of Representatives objected to the inclusion of
the words "one trial" on the ground that it might actually impair de-
fendants' rights, 3 0 no one objected to the restriction on multiple pun-
ishments. To the contrary, the only statement on that language was by
Representative Egbert Benson, who noted that the "humane" reason
23 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 377 (1739) (footnote
omitted).
24 See 1 JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, THE NEW SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PLEAD-
ING AND EVIDENCE IN INDICTABLE CASES 111-14 (1852); 9 EDWARD E. BURNS, STANDARD ENCY-
CLOPAEDIA OF PROCEDURE 90-91 (Edgar W. Camp ed., 1914).
25 See I ARCHBOLD, supra note 24, at 111; 9 BuRNS, supra note 24, at 89-90; see also Crist
v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 40-41 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause was directed" to address the "pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict");
George C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 827, 828
(identifying the pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit as "the 'core' double jeopardy
clause protection").
26 Rudstein, supra note 17, at 222 (alteration in original) (quoting Massachusetts
Body of Liberties 42 (1641), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORI-
GINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 153
(Richard L. Perry &John C. Cooper eds., 1959)).
27 Id.
28 ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 81-82 (1930); SIGLER, supra
note 18, at 24-26; Rudstein, supra note 17, at 223-26; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Double
Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE LJ. 1807, 1814 (1997) ("At common law, the double
jeopardy idea encompassed two basic pleas in bar, prior acquittal and prior conviction-in
law French, autrefois acquit de mime felonie and autrefois convict de mime felonie.").
29 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
30 Id. at 782. At the time, defendants could request second trials following conviction
in some circumstances, and the language was perceived potentially to undermine this
right.
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for a prohibition on double jeopardy was to prevent more than one
punishment for a single offense.
31
These debates suggest that the Clause was meant to prohibit mul-
tiple punishments, but they are not conclusive. Although the House
approved Madison's version, the final version, which was introduced
in the Senate, replaced the words "except in case of impeachment, to
more than one trial, or one punishment" with "be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb." According to some, most notably Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, jeopardy encompasses only tri-
als and not "punishment," and the Double Jeopardy Clause thus pro-
hibits only "successive prosecution, not successive punishment."
32
The reason for the change in the Clause's language is un-
known.33 It may have been an effort to conform the language to
Blackstone's description of the right, namely that it was a "universal
maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought
into jeopardy of his life, more than once, for the same offence."
34
What is known, however, is that preventing multiple punishments was
foremost in the Framers' thoughts, as demonstrated by the statements
in the House. 35 Given that the House accepted the Senate's textual
changes after the earlier statements in the House record that prevent-
ing multiple punishments was essential, it seems unlikely that Con-
gress understood the new text to remove the protection against
multiple punishments.
3 6
History also does not conclusively resolve whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits recidivism enhancements. Although the
colonies generally did not permit multiple punishments for the same
offense, they did not consistently treat enhancements for recidivism as
a second punishment for a prior offense. A few colonies had statutes
that increased criminal penalties for some recidivists. 37 The Massa-
31 See id. at 781-82; John 0. Bigelow, Former Conviction and Former Acquittal, 11
RUTGERS L. REv. 487, 488 (1957).
32 Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 804-05 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 406-07 (1995) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (interpreting "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" to mean "twice prose-
cuted for the same offense"); Lear, supra note 9, at 742-43 ("[T] he Double Jeopardy
Clause . . . authorize[s] additional punishment for previously adjudicated offenses upon
conviction of a subsequent crime.").
33 See Bigelow, supra note 31, at 489 ("The Annals of Congress do not show clearly the
later moulding of Madison's amendments.").
34 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *329; see also Bigelow, supra note 31, at 489 (hy-
pothesizing that the language came from Vaux's Case, (1591) 76 Eng. Rep. 992 (K.B.) 993)
35 See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
36 See Note, supra note 14, at 266 n.13 (noting that preventing multiple punishment
under the Double Jeopardy Clause was foremost in the minds of the Framers).
37 See, e.g., Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912);Jay A. Sigler, A History of
Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 302-03 (1963) (noting that in some colonies
"[r]epeated criminal offenses also entailed the use of the death penalty").
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chusetts Bay Colony, for example, enacted stiffer penalties for repeat
robbers and burglars.38 Similarly, in 1705, the Virginia House of Bur-
gesses enacted a statute that provided increased penalties for repeat
hog stealers.3 9 The practice continued after the adoption of the Con-
stitution. In 1796, both Virginia and New York enacted statutes pro-
viding for increased punishments for repeat offenders, and other
states later followed suit.40 These laws arguably suggest that the
Double Jeopardy Clause was not understood to prohibit enhance-
ments for prior offenses.41 On the other hand, most colonies did not
enact statutes that increased criminal penalties for recidivists. Indeed,
it was not until the early twentieth century that recidivism statutes be-
came widespread.
42
It is not clear that the Double Jeopardy Clause meant to codify
the laws and practices of the few colonies that permitted recidivism
enhancements.43 Unlike many other constitutional rights, the right
against double jeopardy was missing from most colonial constitu-
tions.44 Including the Double Jeopardy Clause was a deliberate effort
to provide more rights than most of the colonies provided. Further-
more, the Double Jeopardy Clause was not incorporated against the
38 See Act for the Punishment of Criminal Offenders, § 4 (1692), in 1 THE ACTS AND
RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 52 (1869) (pre-
scribing branding for the first conviction and hanging for the second); see also Note, Selec-
tive Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REv. 511, 511
n.1 (1982) ("The Massachusetts Bay Colony had recidivist laws for robbers and burglars at
least as early as 1692."). Although this legislation was enacted in 1692, the 1641 Massachu-
setts Bay Colony Body of Liberties prohibited the imposition of multiple punishments. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
39 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA
276-78 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823) (1619).
40 Graham, 224 U.S. at 623.
41 See id.; Lear, supra note 9, at 743 n.75.
42 See Michael G. Turner et al., "Three Strikes and You're Out" Legislation: A National
Assessment, 59 FED. PROBATION 16, 17 (1995) (noting that application of habitual-offender
laws was "minimal" in early America, but that such laws "flourished in the U.S. throughout
the 1920's").
43 See Rudstein, supra note 17, at 227-28 (noting the public pressure to create a right
against double jeopardy despite the absence of such a right in most colonies).
44 See SIGLER, supra note 18, at 23, 300; Bigelow, supra note 31, at 487. Notably, the
Massachusetts Bay Colony both prohibited multiple punishments and enacted a recidivism
statute. See supra note 38. There may have been as much as a fifty-year delay between the
prohibition of multiple punishments and the enactment of the recidivism statute. But
even if the recidivism statute were enacted sooner, that does not necessarily mean that the
right against multiple punishments does not prohibit recidivism enhancements. Soon af-
ter the Founding, Congress itself enacted various laws that seemed to conflict with the
recently adopted Constitution. The Alien and Sedition Act, for example, severely curtailed
freedom of the press, which "indisputably violated our present understanding of the First
Amendment." Rather than serving as an example of how narrowly we ought to interpret
that right today, the Act instead serves as an example that "leaders who have drafted and
voted for a text are eminently capable of violating their own rules." Van Orden v. Perry,
545 U.S. 677, 726 n.27 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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states until 1969.45 Before that time, only the federal government was
bound by the Clause. Most states, accordingly, were not constrained
by any facet of the Double Jeopardy Clause when enacting their recidi-
vist statutes. So far as our research reveals, the federal government
did not enact a recidivist statute until 1831.46 Thus, the existence of a
few recidivist statutes in early American history does not necessarily
demonstrate that those statutes were consistent with the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause in the Constitution.
In short, though history provides evidence that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments, the evidence is not con-
clusive. Nevertheless, courts have found the evidence supporting a
right against multiple punishments in the Clause persuasive, consist-
ently declaring that the Clause does indeed contain such a right.
47
B. Current State of the Law
Although proclaiming that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
against multiple punishments for the same offense, 48 the Supreme
Court has largely failed to provide any real protection against multiple
punishments. 49 Instead, it has developed doctrines that strip away vir-
tually all substance from the right.
One way that courts have removed the substance of the prohibi-
tion on multiple punishments is by failing to enforce the prohibition
against legislatures. Courts have held that, if the legislature authorizes
45 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 784 (1969).
46 Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 37, § 1, 4 Stat. 448, 448 (imposing punishment for a
"second conviction" of petty larceny).
There is a 1789 statute governing the registration of vessels that imposed a $500 fine
on anyone who failed to fulfill various duties imposed by the statute. A second conviction
of the same offense carried the same fine, but it also disqualified that person from "hold-
ing any office of trust or profit under the United States." Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 34,
1 Stat. 55, 65. This disqualification upon a second conviction could be characterized as a
recidivism penalty; however, disqualification from public office is best understood as a col-
lateral consequence rather than as a criminal punishment. See C. Roger Vinson, Special
Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929, 941-50
(1970) (noting that the English common-law practice of declaring those convicted of trea-
son and other felonies "attainted" resulted in the divestiture of many civil rights, including
the right to hold public office); id. at 987-94 (describing the state and federal statutes and
constitutional provisions that disqualify persons convicted of certain crimes from holding
public office). The characterization of disqualification from public office as a collateral
consequence is important to the double jeopardy question because courts ordinarily deem
collateral consequences to be civil penalties rather than criminal penalties and thus not
subject to double jeopardy challenges. See Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated
Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 640-41 (2006).
47 See sources cited supra note 14.
48 See, e.g., Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1984); North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
49 See, e.g., Poulin, supra note 9, at 611-13 & n.69 (collecting cases where the Court
has undercut the right against multiple punishments).
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two punishments for one crime, then a court may impose both pun-
ishments on a defendant convicted of that crime.5 0 Thus, the limit on
multiple punishments is not a substantive constitutional limitation;
legislatures may authorize multiple punishments through legislation.
This deference stands in stark contrast to the Court's protection of
the other primary protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause-the right against multiple prosecutions. The Court has held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause does create a substantive restriction
on multiple prosecutions. 51 In no situation may the government pur-
sue successive prosecutions for the "same offense.
'52
Even so, courts have recognized that the rule against multiple
punishments does impose a procedural constitutional limitation of
sorts by limiting the judiciary's ability to impose punishment. The
Double Jeopardy Clause, the courts have said, "does no more than
prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment
than the legislature intended."53 But this is no limitation at all. Legis-
50 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981). Although concluding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent the legislature from authorizing multiple punish-
ments for one crime, the Court has adopted a rule of statutory construction against multi-
ple punishments for one offense. When two statutes authorize punishment for one
offense, courts will presume that a defendant cannot be punished under both unless the
legislature says otherwise. This presumption, however, does not derive from the Double
Jeopardy Clause; instead, it is based on the common sense assumption that legislatures
"ordinarily do[ ] not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes."
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980).
51 United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993).
52 The Court has not indicated that statutory construction and legislative intent are
irrelevant considerations in cases involving claims of multiple prosecutions. Those claims
often turn on whether two offenses are the "same" for double jeopardy purposes. Legisla-
tures have not only the power to prescribe the amount of punishment for criminal offenses
but also to define those offenses. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legisla-
ture, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 456-58 (2010); Poulin, supra note 9, at 606. Thus, in decid-
ing whether an offense is the "same," courts often treat the question as one of statutory
construction and legislative intent. The constitutional power to define offenses, coupled
with the Double Jeopardy Clause's limitation to offenses that are the "same," has led some
commentators to conclude that the protection against multiple prosecutions is a limit only
on prosecutors and that the Clause imposes no substantive limitation on legislatures. See,
e.g., THOMAS, supra note 9, at 67 (proposing that double jeopardy "is a procedural and not
a substantive protection," so that courts can do no more than "divine legislative intent"
regarding double jeopardy concerns in all double jeopardy analyses including cases involv-
ing successive prosecutions). It seems unlikely, however, that the courts would permit the
legislature to authorize a direct violation of the protection against successive prosecu-
tions-for example, by enacting a statute that permits prosecutors to pursue successive
prosecutions under the identical statute following either a conviction or an acquittal. And,
in any event, the Court itself has not stated that the protection places no limitations on
legislatures. See generally Poulin, supra note 9, at 609-11 (arguing that deference to legisla-
tures in multiple-punishment cases does not and ought not extend to cases involving multi-
ple prosecutions).
53 See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 793 (1985) (quoting Missouri v. Hunter,
459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)); see also Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344 ("[T]he question of what pun-
ishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punish-
ments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.").
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latures hold the power to define punishments for criminal offenses,
and courts may never impose a punishment greater than that author-
ized by the legislature.54 Even without the Double Jeopardy Clause, a
court could not impose a second punishment without legislative
authorization.
55
The Court has justified its decision to exempt legislatures from
the restriction on multiple punishments on the ground that legisla-
tures have the power to set the punishments for criminal offenses.
According to the Court, a statute authorizing two punishments of
amount X is no different from a statute authorizing a single punish-
ment of 2X for that same offense. 56 Thus, the Court has concluded
that whether a person may be punished for one act under two statutes
is ultimately a legislative question. Cumulative punishments may be
imposed under separate statutes so long as the legislature has clearly
authorized those punishments. 57 In that case, no double jeopardy
protections apply.
A second way that courts have diluted the prohibition on multi-
ple punishments is by refusing to apply it at sentencing. This is most
apparent in the context of recidivism enhancements. Every state and
the federal government has enacted statutes that punish recidivists
more severely than first-time offenders. 58 Some statutes punish recidi-
vists more severely by classifying second and subsequent offenses as a
higher class of offense than first offenses. 59 Other statutes provide for
54 See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) ("It is the legisla-
ture, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment."); see also
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689 ("The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy em-
bodies in this respect simply one aspect of the basic principle that within our federal con-
stitutional framework the legislative power, including the power to define criminal offenses
and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty of them, resides
wholly with the Congress.").
55 That is not to say that judges lack authority to increase sentences based on a defen-
dant's prior convictions if the legislature has failed to enact a habitual-offender statute.
Because courts have held that double jeopardy does not apply at sentencing, see infta text
accompanying notes 58-68, judges are free to increase the sentences of repeat offenders,
so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the maximum punishment authorized by
the legislature.
56 See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344; see also Note, supra note 14, at 302 (equating two con-
victions and sentencings for a single offense with one conviction and a doubled penalty for
the same offense).
57 Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688; Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,165 (1977) ("Where consecu-
tive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guaran-
tee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by
imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.").
58 STATUTES REQUIRING CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 5, at 11; see also Carissa Byrne
Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REv. 1109, 1115 (2008)
("Every state has enacted legislation that punishes recidivists more severely than first
offenders.").
59 STATUTES REQUIRING CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 5, at 11. Sometimes the offense
is classified as a more serious offense if the offender has a previous conviction for the same
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the imposition of higher penalties on recidivists either through statu-
tory mandatory minimum sentences or by increasing statutory maxi-
mum sentences. 60 Several states have adopted so-called "three strikes"
laws, under which an offender must receive a sentence of life impris-
onment if she is convicted three times (or sometimes two times6 or
four times62 ) of a certain class of felonies. 63 Sentencing guidelines
also routinely call for increased punishment for those defendants with
prior convictions. 64 And even when a statute or guideline does not
mandate recidivism enhancements, many judges often use their sen-
tencing discretion to increase sentences based on prior convictions.
6 5
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that these sentencing en-
hancements do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.66 The Court
crime. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22-127 (2010) ("Any person who practices or offers or
attempts to practice pharmacy without an active license issued under this article commits a
class 2 misdemeanor . . . for the first offense, and any person committing a second or
subsequent offense commits a class 6 felony .... "). But sometimes a particular offense is
classified as a more serious offense if the offender has any of a number of prior convic-
tions. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-2-23(d) (LexisNexis 2009) ("A person who violates sec-
tion 22 [IC 3547-2-22] of this chapter commits a Class A misdemeanor. However, the
offense is a Class D felony if the person has a prior conviction of any offense under this
subsection or subsection (c), or if the person has been convicted of a felony within fifteen
(15) years before the date of the offense." (alteration in original)).
60 STATUTES REQUIRING CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 5, at 12.
61 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-2545(A) (2003 & Supp. 2010).
62 See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-201(b)(ii) (2009).
63 SeeJames Austin et al., The Impact of 'Three Strikes and You're Out,' 1 PUNISHMENT &
Soc'Y 131, 134-37 (1999) (describing various three strikes legislation and "strikeable of-
fenses" across jurisdictions).
64 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c) (15) (2010); CAL. CRiM. R. CT. 4.421(b) (2); HAw.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-662(1) (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2521 (1) (f) (2004);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. I.B (West 2010); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.12(E)(2)
(LexisNexis 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-114(1) (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§9.94A.535(2)(d) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4A1.1 (2010); MODEL PENAL CODE SENTENCING § 6B.07 (2006); see also STATUTES REQUIR-
ING CRIMINAL HISTORY, supra note 5, at 12 ("States have established sentencing guidelines
that take prior convictions into consideration in setting sentence ranges for particular of-
fenses or that permit judges to sentence above the recommended ranges for persons with
specified prior convictions."). In the federal system, an offender's criminal history is one
of the two major factors used to arrive at a Guideline sentence-the other being the of-
fense for which the offender was convicted. KATE STITH &Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OFJUDG-
ING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 72, 218 n.219.
65 SeeAlmendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998) ("[P]rior commis-
sion of a serious crime . . . is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine."); Wil-
liams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1959) (upholding a death sentence despite the
fact that the judge imposed the sentence based on the defendant's commission of another
crime for which the defendant had already been convicted and sentenced); see also Hessick,
supra note 58, at 1114-16 ("[P]rior convictions are widely recognized as aggravating sen-
tencing factors and are often used to increase the sentences of individual defendants.");
Roberts, supra note 9, at 304 ("After the seriousness of the crime, the criminal history of
the offender is the most important determinant of sentence severity in common-law
jurisdictions.").
66 Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623, 631 (1912); McDonald v. Massachu-
setts, 180 U.S. 311, 312-13 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676-77 (1895); see also
CORAELL LAW REVIEW
has provided two justifications. The first is that the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects only against multiple punishments for the same of-
fense and an enhancement does not amount to an "offense." Rather,
it is simply an aggravating factor to be considered in imposing a sen-
tence for the offense of conviction. 67 The second justification is that
the sentence increase is not a second punishment for the prior of-
fense but is instead based on "the manner in which [the defendant]
committed the crime of conviction." 68 These justifications are dis-
cussed in further detail below in Part II.B.
II
EXPANDING DOUBLE JEOPARDY BEYOND ITS
CURRENT BOUNDARIES
Despite the Court's statements to the contrary, 69 in practice it has
not interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause as providing any real pro-
tection against multiple punishments. This of course raises the ques-
tion whether the Double Jeopardy Clause actually does provide such
protection. Certainly, if the Clause does not do so, the Court should
not continue to claim that the Clause does provide such protection,
while at the same time not actually enforcing that right. Doing so
obscures the law and undermines the legitimacy of the Court.
70
As this Part explains, the Clause does, or at least should, protect
against multiple punishments. Protecting individuals against multiple
punishments is logically a crucial component of the right against
double jeopardy. Even if the Double Jeopardy Clause were only in-
tended to protect individuals from multiple prosecutions, that protec-
tion would be incomplete and inadequate if it did not also protect
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962) (stating that the constitutionality of habitual-
offender laws is "no longer open to serious challenge"). For a description of early state
cases upholding such statutes, see White, supra note 8, at 730-33.
67 Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732
(1948).
68 Monge, 524 U.S. at 728 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Watts, 519
U.S. 148, 154 (1997) (per curiam)); see also Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 402-03
(1995) ("To the extent that the Guidelines aggravate punishment for related conduct
outside the elements of the crime... [,] the offender is still punished only for the fact that
the present offense was carried out in a manner that warrants increased punishment, not for
a different offense ....").
69 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
70 "[T]he Court's influence depends in large part on the reasoning in its written deci-
sions. When that reasoning suffers from obvious inconsistencies or other shortcomings,
the Court itself suffers as an institution-especially where those inconsistencies could po-
tentially be interpreted as a lack of candor on the part of the Court." Carissa Byrne Hes-
sick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 At.A. L. REv. 1, 39-40
(2008) (footnotes omitted); see also David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100
HARV. L. REv. 731, 737 (1987) ("[L]ack of candor seldom goes undetected for long, and its
detection only serves to increase the level of cynicism about the nature of judging and of
judges.").
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against multiple punishments. Moreover, the protection against mul-
tiple punishments should extend to recidivism enhancements. The
only reason that the additional recidivism punishment is imposed is
that the defendant was convicted for the earlier crime. It strains logic
to claim that this additional punishment does not punish that earlier
offense a second time.
A. Multiple Punishment Protection Is Essential to Double
Jeopardy
To understand why the Double Jeopardy Clause should robustly
protect against not only multiple prosecutions but also multiple pun-
ishments, one must begin by remembering that the Clause protects
both those who have been previously acquitted and those who have
been previously convicted. Those who have been previously acquitted
have different interests at stake than those who have been previously
convicted.
So far as double jeopardy is concerned, the principal interest of
those who have been previously acquitted is to avoid multiple trials for
the same offense. (They need not worry about being subjected to
multiple punishments, because they have not yet suffered a punish-
ment.) The threat of multiple trials undermines the finality of jury
verdicts, exposes the defendant to government harassment, and leaves
the defendant with the anxiety of potential prosecutions. More im-
portantly, it impairs the defendant's ability to defend herself, not only
because of mounting litigation costs, but also because each trial gives
the government an opportunity to preview and adjust to the defense
strategy.7 Similarly, multiple trials increase the probability that an
innocent person will be convicted because the government may follow
each acquittal with another prosecution until it finds ajury willing to
convict.
72
As further discussed below, these problems largely arise only
when the government seeks to bring a second prosecution against a
person who has already been acquitted. Indeed, the right against
double jeopardy has sometimes been described as a right necessary to
guard against the conviction of innocent defendants. 7 3 Framing
71 See Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals
of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1007 (1980); see also Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (stating that the right against double jeopardy ensures that "the State
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to con-
vict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, ex-
pense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity").
72 Westen, supra note 71, at 1006; Note, supra note 14, at 278.
73 See, e.g., Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88 (1957); see also Lear, supra note 9, at 744 (noting
that "[p]unishment for prior convictions at sentencing is completely consistent with" the
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double jeopardy as protecting against erroneous convictions is consis-
tent with a number of other criminal procedure rights, such as the
right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to ajury
trial. This focus on previously acquitted defendants explains the con-
clusion of courts and commentators that the primary aim of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is to protect against multiple prosecutions.
7 4
But the right against double jeopardy is not limited to protecting
only the previously acquitted. The text of the Clause makes no dis-
tinction between prior convictions and acquittals. It prohibits
"be [ing] twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"-that is, being twice
subject to the possibility of punishment-irrespective of the outcome
in the prior case. Nor does history suggest that the right is limited to
prior acquittals. As noted earlier, historically courts recognized a
right against multiple punishments, and the possibility of a second
punishment arises only when the defendant has been convicted. One
of the direct historical antecedents of the Double Jeopardy Clause was
the common-law plea autrefois convict, which could be raised by an in-
dividual who had already been convicted. 75 Those individuals who
had been acquitted of a crime could terminate a subsequent prosecu-
tion for the same offense by pleading autrefois acquit.76 If Double Jeop-
ardy were intended only to protect the innocent, then the separate
plea of autrefois convict would have been unnecessary.
77
What is more, if the Double Jeopardy Clause were intended only
to protect those who have been acquitted of an offense, then the
Clause would seem to be largely duplicative of the Sixth Amendment
jury trial right.78 Once ajury acquits a defendant, even if the acquittal
seems contrary to law, the verdict may not be relitigated. Allowing
goals of double jeopardy in part because "[ t] here is no question regarding the defendant's
legal innocence").
74 See supra text accompanying notes 71-73; see also Poulin, supra note 9, at 599 (char-
acterizing the "core double jeopardy protection" as the "protection from successive
prosecution[s]").
75 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 25.
77 See Amar, supra note 28, at 1815 ("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause, via the constitu-
tionally guaranteed plea of autrefois convict, protects even the guilty."); Peter Westen &
Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 81, 107 (not-
ing that the "principal interest" protected in the context of retrial following conviction "is
that underlying the historical plea of autrefois convict, namely, to protect the defendant
from being subjected to double punishment for the same offense").
78 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Indeed, some commenta-
tors have explained the double jeopardy right against subsequent prosecution after acquit-
tal in terms of a Sixth Amendment jury trial right. See Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L.
Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 57-59 (1995); Barry L.
Johnson, If At First You Don't Succeed-Abolishing the Use of Acquitted Conduct in Guidelines
Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REv. 153, 181-82 (1996); Westen, supra note 71, at 1012-18; Westen
& Drubel, supra note 77, at 129-32.
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relitigation would infringe upon the jury's role of preventing the gov-
ernment from punishing an individual whom the public believes
should not be punished.7 9 The Sixth Amendment already protects
against retrial after acquittal, and ordinary principles of statutory and
constitutional construction counsel against treating the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause as surplusage. 80
Those who previously have been convicted do not have the same
double jeopardy interests in avoiding multiple trials as those who have
been acquitted. The primary evils associated with multiple prosecu-
tions-in particular the dangers associated with the government
previewing defense strategy and potential infringement on jury ver-
dicts-simply are not present when a defendant has already been con-
victed. For defendants who have already been convicted, the
government has already developed a successful strategy against the de-
fense, and a second conviction is consistent with the jury's prior
verdict.
Instead of seeking to avoid potential government advantage at a
second trial, the primary interest of a defendant who has already been
convicted is to avoid the consequences of a second trial-that is, a
second punishment. For the previously convicted defendant, the
Double Jeopardy Clause serves to ensure that she does not face an-
other punishment for an offense after already serving the punishment
for that offense duly meted out through the judicial process.
To be sure, retrying defendants who have already been convicted
exposes them to the threat of harassment by repeat litigation and liti-
gation expenses. 81 But these concerns are less central to the right
against double jeopardy than the concern with governmental advan-
tage over the defendant. The law regularly distinguishes between the
harm arising from deprivations of rights (such as due process) and
the harm resulting from exposure to harassment and expense. It af-
fords substantial protections against the former, and ordinarily re-
79 See Amar, supra note 28, at 1846 ("Under the Sixth Amendment, however, a crimi-
nal jury has the right to acquit a defendant even in the face of indisputable factual evi-
dence of guilt." (footnote omitted)); Westen, supra note 71, at 1016 ("[llnsofar as the
criminal jury may dispense mercy to defendants by vetoing or nullifying the law, the crimi-
nal jury does possess authority to decide the law.").
8o See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be pre-
sumed that any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be without effect .... ).
81 A number of commentators have characterized prevention of government harass-
ment as a key value protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Monroe G. McKay,
Double Jeopardy: Are the Pieces the Puzzle?, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 18 (1983); Susan R. Klein,
Double Jeopardy's Demise, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1001, 1027-36 (2000) (reviewing THOMAS, supra
note 9); Note, supra note 14, at 286-92. But see THoMAS, supra note 9, at 50-52 (noting a
number of problems with construing the Clause as a protection against harassment). Jus-
tice O'Connor also suggested that the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect
against government oppression. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 796 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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quires parties to bear the costs of the latter.8 2 Moreover, if the goal of
the Double Jeopardy Clause were to prevent government harassment,
as opposed to preventing multiple punishments, one would expect a
Clause targeting not just harassment through multiple prosecutions,
but government harassment generally, including through law-enforce-
ment tactics.8 3 What is more, it is unclear that a successive trial is,
indeed, an unwarranted drain on the defendant. All trials consume
resources, but the tradeoff is that trials provide process. If multiple
punishments are allowed, one would think that it is better if they were
imposed after a second verdict, which was the subject of that process,
instead of being based solely on the first conviction. 84
Nor does the argument based on harassment from repeated pros-
ecutions carry much weight. A second trial is harassing only if the trial
carries some potential punishment; otherwise it could be ignored.85 If
the government is prohibited from seeking to punish a person a second
time after conviction, a fortiori, the government must be prohibited
from imposing a second punishment, for it would be nonsensical to
prohibit the government from seeking to do something that it is al-
lowed to do.
86
82 Compare In re Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating
that "unrecoverable costs of litigation.., do not" warrant mandamus), and Sherri A.D. v.
Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 204 n.15 (5th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that "increased cost of litigation
alone" does not warrant interlocutory appeal), with Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77 (2d
Cir. 1992) (concluding that a possible deprivation of constitutional rights sufficiently
demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief).
83 Commentators have sometimes suggested that there is a due process right against
government harassment. See, e.g., Amar & Marcus, supra note 78, at 36 n.184; Nancy J.
King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144
U. PA. L. REv. 101, 130-34 (1995). But remarks in judicial opinions suggest that govern-
ment harassment may not be subject to constitutional challenge-or at least that it is un-
likely to be captured and remedied by ordinary criminal justice processes. See, e.g., Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (suggesting that a prisoner must resort to "state tort
and common-law remedies" rather than the Fourth Amendment to address "calculated
harassment" by prison officials); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-15 & n.9 (1968) (noting that
police "may accost a woman in an area known for prostitution as part of a harassment
campaign designed to drive prostitutes away without the considerable difficulty involved in
prosecuting them" and that "[t]he wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police
community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not
be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial" (footnote omitted)).
84 The Supreme Court's decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224
(1998), makes clear that a defendant's sentence may be increased based on a prior convic-
tion without requiring the government to prove to a jury either the fact of the previous
conviction or the facts underlying that conviction. Id. at 227, 241.
85 Cf Poulin, supra note 9, at 619 ("Successive prosecution often goes hand-in-hand
with the threat of additional punishment.... Consequently, discussion of successive prose-
cution often focuses not only on the successive trials, but also on the additional multiple
punishment that would be imposed if each trial ended in conviction.").
86 The Supreme Court appeared to recognize the secondary nature of this interest in
Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), in which the Court suggested that the prohi-
bition on multiple trials was a common-law extension of the prohibition on multiple pun-
ishments. See id. at 169 ("The common law not only prohibited a second punishment for
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What all this suggests is that preventing multiple punishments is
the animating principle of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the limi-
tation on multiple trials for previously convicted defendants is simply
a means to enforce the prohibition on that restriction on multiple
punishments.8 7 For this reason, current double jeopardy doctrine
ought to be expanded to encompass a robust right against multiple
punishments.
Justices Scalia and Thomas have resisted this argument on the
ground that the Clause's text does not prohibit multiple punishments
because it prohibits only repeat 'jeopardy," not repeat punishments. 88
On this view, even if the reason for the Clause is to protect against
multiple punishments, the Clause accomplishes this goal by prohibit-
ing multiple trials instead of by barring multiple punishments directly.
But this argument puts form before function.
At the time of the drafting of the Clause, a separate prohibition
on multiple punishments would have been extraneous: "During colo-
nial times and at the Founding, the process of sentencing was virtually
indistinguishable from the process of conviction. A judge ordinarily
did not conduct a separate sentencing proceeding following a defen-
dant's conviction; instead, most crimes carried a particular penalty."89
Because punishment could be imposed only following a trial, prohibit-
ing successive trials would effectively prevent multiple punishments. 90
In short, by prohibiting multiple trials, the Founders likely thought
that they were simultaneously protecting against multiple
punishments.
Moreover, the Court has generally rejected the textualist ap-
proach advocated by Justices Scalia and Thomas in interpreting the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Consider the phrase "life or limb." The Su-
preme Court has not interpreted that phrase to limit the Clause's pro-
tection to only those offenses bearing a penalty of death or loss of
limb. Instead, it has interpreted the Clause to apply to fines, terms of
imprisonment, and other forms of punishment.9 1 Another example
the same offence, but it went further and forbid a second trial for the same offence .... ).
Further evidence that the prohibition on multiple punishments was more highly valued
than the prohibition on multiple trials is the Court's occasional greater concern with sec-
ond trials following conviction rather than acquittal. SeeIn re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 187-90
(1889).
87 "The primary purpose of foreclosing a second prosecution after conviction ... is to
prevent a defendant from being subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense."
Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 307 (1984).
88 See supra notes 14 & 32 and accompanying text.
89 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 51. But see infra note 120.
90 There are a few historical exceptions to this general rule-namely, there appear to
have been a small number of habitual-offender statutes in effect around the time of the
Founding. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
91 See, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 168-73.
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comes from the phrase "same offence." Under a literal approach,
"same" should mean same-the Double Jeopardy Clause should apply
to only identical offenses. 92 But neither history nor practice support
that view. The restriction was not historically limited to identical of-
fenses, as is clear from Blackstone's claim that double jeopardy barred
prosecutions for both manslaughter and murder.93 Nor has the Court
required strict identity of offenses. Instead, it has employed a number
of tests, ranging from whether the elements of the offenses overlap, to
whether the offenses involved the same conduct, to determine
whether two offenses are the same.
94
Since the Fifth Amendment's adoption, the imposition of punish-
ment has greatly changed. The amount of punishment a defendant
receives is no longer determined solely by the offense of conviction.
Judicial discretion within a sentencing range or sentencing guidelines
permits different defendants to receive different sentences even if
they have been convicted of the same crime.95 And the proliferation
of statutes increasing criminal penalties for defendants with prior con-
victions significantly postdates the Founding. In fact, such provisions
do not appear to have become common until the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. 96 The mere fact that punishment and trials
are no longer inextricably linked does not mean that the DoubleJeop-
ardy Clause ought not be interpreted in a fashion that accounts for
92 See Amar, supra note 28, at 1814-18.
93 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *330.
94 See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1994);
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696-97 (1993); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510
(1990); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176,
188 (1889). This departure from text is not unique to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Con-
stitutional controversies often arise because the text of the Constitution is inconclusive. In
interpreting the text, courts frequently resort to the reasons underlying the constitutional
provision. And often those reasons embodied in the text prompt the courts to extend the
constitutional protection beyond its text. Consider the Fourth Amendment. Courts do
not limit its protection to "persons, houses, papers, and effects." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Rather, they extend it to anything in which a person has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 215 n.5 (1986); see also infra
text accompanying notes 98-100. More importantly, courts have extended constitutional
protection to nontextual unenumerated rights when those rights are implicit within enu-
merated rights. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment's
protections on speech and religion implicitly create a broader right to associate with others
to engage in those activities. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("An individ-
ual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of griev-
ances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative
freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaran-
teed.... Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others
in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cul-
tural ends."). According to courts, the right to freedom of speech would be too weak
without the ability to associate with others to exercise that right.
95 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 52-53.
96 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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these changes in the criminal justice system. Rather, the Clause ought
to be interpreted in a fashion that continues to protect defendants
against the imposition of multiple punishments in light of these
changes.
Courts regularly adopt greater flexibility in interpreting constitu-
tional provisions when the circumstances surrounding those provi-
sions have changed. 97  Consider, for example, the Fourth
Amendment, which protects the "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."98 As technology has advanced, police are now
able to conduct investigations through such means as thermal imag-
ing and electronic eavesdropping that infringe upon personal privacy
without conducting physical searches of "persons, houses, papers, [or]
effects." 99 These technological advances have forced courts to restruc-
ture the right, analyzing the question of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion in terms of the underlying right of privacy. 10 0 In other words, the
Court identified the overarching interest protected by the specific lan-
guage in the Amendment and has interpreted it as prohibiting state
actions that impermissibly infringe upon that interest, even when
those actions do not seem to implicate the specific examples in the
constitutional text. Because both the logic and the history of the
Double Jeopardy Clause suggest that it was intended to protect not
97 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021-22 (2010) (interpreting the
Eighth Amendment based on current societal notions of what constitutes appropriate pun-
ishment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (relying on principles underlying
the Due Process Clause to bar laws outlawing sodomy); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 226-27 (inter-
preting Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution according to its underlying principle);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (interpreting Equal Protection Clause to
promote the principle of equality). Even originalists have endorsed an approach under
which constitutional provisions are interpreted according to their underlying principles.
See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132 (2003) (advocating that the Constitution be inter-
preted according to how it "would have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, rea-
sonably well-informed reader of those words and phrases, in context, at the time they were
adopted, and within the political and linguistic community in which they were adopted");
see alsoJack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
427, 432-36 (2007) (advocating a method of interpreting the Constitution according to
the principles underlying its provisions).
98 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
99 E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 39-30 (2001) (thermal imaging); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (electronic eavesdropping).
100 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886) ("It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property .... ); see also Hudson v. Michigan,
547 U.S. 586, 603 (2006) ("[P]rivacy and security in the home are central to the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees .... "); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (noting that
the Fourth Amendment "embodies [the] centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy
of the home").
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only against multiple prosecutions but also against multiple punish-
ments, modern double jeopardy doctrine ought to expand to accom-
modate both protections.
B. Recidivism Enhancements Constitute Multiple Punishments
If the Double Jeopardy Clause bars multiple punishments for a
single offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause should also prohibit recid-
ivism enhancements at sentencing where the defendant has already
been punished for the earlier crime of conviction. Sentencing en-
hancements are a form of punishment, and an individual who receives
a recidivism enhancement based on a prior conviction suffers two
punishments for the same offense. The first is the punishment follow-
ing the first conviction, and the second is the enhancement author-
ized by the recidivism statute that is triggered by that original
conviction. The statutory offense that formed the basis of the first
conviction is the basis for both punishments; thus the defendant is
receiving multiple punishments for the same offense:' 0 '
Courts have provided a variety of justifications for rejecting
double jeopardy challenges to sentencing enhancements for prior of-
fenses. One common justification is the assertion that offenders are
not being punished for their previous crimes, but rather that the of-
fenders' previously committed offenses render their present offenses
"aggravated" and deserving of more punishment. t0 2 This argument
101 As the Court explained in Ex parte Lange.
If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it
is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence. And
though there have been nice questions in the application of this rule to
cases in which the act charged was such as to come within the definition of
more than one statutory offence, or to bring the party within the jurisdic-
tion of more than one court, there has never been any doubt of its entire
and complete protection of the party when a second punishment is pro-
posed in the same court, on the same facts, for the same statutory offence.
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873).
102 E.g., Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998) ("Nor have sentence enhance-
ments been construed as additional punishment for the previous offense; rather, they act
to increase a sentence 'because of the manner in which [the defendant] committed the
crime of conviction."' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Watts, 519 U.S.
148, 154 (1997) (per curiam))); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) ("En-
hancement statutes, whether in the nature of criminal history provisions such as those
contained in the Sentencing Guidelines, or recidivist statutes that are commonplace in
state criminal laws, do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction. As
pointed out in the dissenting opinion in Baldasar, '[t]his Court consistently has sustained
repeat-offender laws as penalizing only the last offense committed by the defendant."' (al-
teration in original) (quoting Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting))); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (stating that a recidivism enhance-
ment "is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier
crimes" but as "a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggra-
vated offense because a repetitive one"); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912)
("They are not punished the second time for the earlier offense, but the repetition of
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tries to obscure substance behind semantics. 10 3 The mere fact that a
consideration has been labeled an aggravating sentencing factor in no
way means that the defendant is not being punished because of that
consideration.1 0 4 After all, those defendants without a prior convic-
tion do not face the potential additional punishment.10 5 Indeed, in
identifying prior convictions as an aggravating sentencing factor,
courts have logically conceded the point that the additional punish-
ment is directly attributable to those previous offenses.
10 6
criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies heavier penalties when they are again
convicted."); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312 (1901) ("The fundamental
mistake of the plaintiff in error is his assumption that the judgment below imposes an
additional punishment on crimes for which he had already been convicted and punished
in Massachusetts and in New Hampshire. But it does no such thing.... The punishment
is for the new crime only, but is the heavier if he is an habitual criminal."); Baker v. Duck-
worth, 752 F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[A] habitual criminal who receives an enhanced
sentence pursuant to an habitual offender statute does not receive additional punishment
for his previous offenses, or punishment for his recidivist status as such, but rather receives
a more severe punishment for his most recent felonious offense.").
At least two Justices have acknowledged that this analysis is flawed. Justice Scalia
(joined by Justice Thomas) has explained that he does not believe that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense; instead, he believes that
the Clause protects only against multiple prosecutions. SeeWitte v. United States, 515 U.S.
389, 406-07 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v.
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 804-05 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's conclusion
seems to be based at least in part on his perception that the Court cannot interpret the
Clause as providing protection against multiple punishments without either prohibiting
recidivism enhancements or creating a false distinction between enhancements and pun-
ishment. See Witte, 515 U.S. at 406-07.
103 Commentators have occasionally noted the weakness of this judicial analysis, but
they nonetheless conclude that a defendant with prior convictions should receive more
punishment. See Lear, supra note 9, at 726, 747-48 (describing the distinction between
punishment and sentencing enhancement as a "convenient yet dangerous fiction," but
nonetheless endorsing the additional punishment for recidivists); Seltzer, supra note 8, at
932, 936 (stating that the Court's analysis "rests substantially on a less-than-clear distinction
between 'punishment' and sentencing under 'enhancement regimes,"' and arguing that
double jeopardy may pose a constitutional bar to habitual-offender statutes when "a recidi-
vism enhancement is substantial and the triggering conviction is relatively insignificant,"
but also conceding that the Court's punishment versus enhancement analysis "may make
sense in 'ordinary' cases" and ultimately concluding that, so long as the recidivism penalty
is not too large, "recidivism statutes are generally constitutional"); Jason White, Note, Once,
Twice, Four Times a Felon: North Carolina's Unconstitutional Recidivist Statutes, 24 CAMPBELL L.
Rsv. 115, 122, 130 (2001) (noting the "fictional distinction between actual punishment
and enhancement of punishment in order to rationalize the constitutionality of recidivist
statutes" but nonetheless concluding that "properly drafted" recidivist laws are "legitimate"
and "an essential element of American criminal law").
104 Cf Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 777 (1994) ("[T]he legislature's description of a statute
as civil does not foreclose the possibility that it has a punitive character.").
105 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 58-60 (making a similar argument in the
context of sentencing enhancements for acquitted conduct).
106 Perhaps unconvinced by its own reasoning, the Court has at times abandoned the
distinction between conceptualizing a recidivism enhancement as punishment for a previ-
ously committed offense or as an aggravating factor triggering higher punishment. In
Witte, for example, the majority opinion notes that the Court's prior cases discussing recidi-
vism enhancements "make clear that a defendant in that situation is punished, for double
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Another justification courts have given is that a sentencing en-
hancement is not an "offense"; it is simply an aggravating factor to be
considered in the imposition of sentence for the offense of convic-
tion.1 0 7 This may be true. But the relevant question is not whether
the recidivism enhancement is an offense; instead, it is whether the
enhancement constitutes a second punishment for an offense for
which the defendant was already punished. It certainly meets that def-
inition, since the enhancement depends on the earlier conviction.
A third reason courts have given to justify sentencing enhance-
ments for prior convictions is that the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not apply at sentencing.'0 8 This reasoning is but one example of a
more general phenomenon of courts refusing to enforce constitu-
tional rights at sentencing. 0 9 As we have explained elsewhere,
'Judges routinely make sentencing decisions based on considerations
that could not constitutionally be considered in the decision whether
to punish an individual in the first place."
110
The reason most commonly given in support of permitting judges
to consider constitutionally suspect sentencing factors is the need to
maximize the information available at sentencing. In rejecting consti-
tutional challenges to sentencing factors, courts often invoke a "long-
standing principle that sentencing courts have broad discretion to
jeopardy purposes, only for the offense of which the defendant is convicted." 515 U.S. at
397; see also id. at 403-04 ("We hold that, where the legislature has authorized such a
particular punishment range for a given crime, the resulting sentence within that range
constitutes punishment only for the offense of conviction for purposes of the double jeop-
ardy inquiry."). This statement seems to acknowledge that the Court has adopted a special-
ized definition of punishment "for double jeopardy purposes"-in other words, that it has
redefined the term "punishment" in order to circumvent the Double Jeopardy Clause.
107 Monge, 524 U.S. at 728; Gryger, 334 U.S. at 732; Baker, 752 F.2d at 304; Davis v.
Bennett, 400 F.2d 279, 281-82 (8th Cir. 1968).
108 See Monge, 524 U.S. at 728 ("Historically, we have found double jeopardy protec-
tions inapplicable to sentencing proceedings.. . ."); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,
747 (1994) ("Reliance on [a prior] conviction is also consistent with the traditional under-
standing of the sentencing process, which we have often recognized as less exacting than
the process of establishing guilt."); see also Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40
UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1219-20 (1993) (" [T] he Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply at
sentencing .... ").
109 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 66 n.94-95, 68 n.106, 85 n.198 (collecting
sources). Notably, the Supreme Court recently observed that "sentencing courts' discre-
tion ... is subject to constitutional constraints," citing a Second Circuit case that forbade
the consideration of a defendant's race or nationality at sentencing. Pepper v. United
States, 13] S. Ct. 1229, 1240 n.8 (2011) (citing United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d
Cir. 1994)). But while courts have uniformly rejected race as a relevant sentencing factor,
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Race and Gender as Explicit Sentencing Factors, 14 J. GENDER RACE &
JusT. 127, 132 (2010); Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 55, they continue to permit
consideration at sentencing of a number of factors that appear to infringe upon constitu-
tional rights, Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 56-73.
110 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 49.
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consider various kinds of information," including information that
might be constitutionally protected.11 '
This information-maximization argument derives from the Su-
preme Court's decision in Williams v. New York. 112 Williams had been
sentenced to death by a state court judge based not only on his crime
of conviction, but also on the judge's assessment of Williams' "past
life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities."' 13
New York law allowed judges to gather this information through affi-
davits and reports to which the defendant had no access. Williams
challenged his sentence, arguing that the consideration of these
materials violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amend-
ment. 114 The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, explaining that
courts can fashion adequately individualized sentences only by know-
ing facts related to the defendant and that forbidding courts from
relying on sources of information not subject to cross examination
would unduly hamper the courts' ability to gather that information.
115
Although raised in the context of the procedural right of confronta-
tion, courts have applied the argument in Williams to challenges re-
garding the type of information a judge may consider at sentencing.
Those courts have concluded that judges must be able to consider all
information, including information that might be constitutionally
protected.116
III United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (per curiam); see also Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 820-21 (1991) ("[T]he sentencing authority has always been free
to consider a wide range of relevant material."); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446
(1972) ("[I]n determining what sentence to impose ... ajudge may appropriately conduct
an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may
consider, or the source from which it may come."); Cross v. United States, 354 F.2d 512,
515 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("[S]entencing judges do, and are entitled to, take into account a
wide range of facts and impressions gleaned from a variety of sources."); United States v.
Magliano, 336 F.2d 817, 822 (4th Cir. 1964) ("The District Court has been given a wide
latitude in the receipt and use of information as an aid to the sentencing pro-
cess .... After conviction, everything of possible pertinency may be considered . ).
112 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
113 Id. at 244-45.
114 Id. at 245.
115 Id. at 248-50. The Court justified the need for comprehensive information about a
defendant on the ground that the information was necessary for courts to make intelligent
assessments about the defendant's prospects of rehabilitation. See id. at 247-48.
116 See, e.g., Watts, 519 U.S. at 151-52 (relying on Williams in holding that courts may
increase sentences based on acquitted conduct); State v. Carico, 968 S.W.2d 280,
287 (Tenn. 1998) (relying on Williams in holding that a sentence could be enhanced based
on uncharged conduct without violating the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments).
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Williams does not provide a firm foundation for the information-
maximization argument.1 17 Williams itself is no longer good law.1 18
And as more recent decisions such as Apprendi v. New Jerseyn1 9 recog-
nize, Williams is based on a factually inaccurate premise that at the
Founding, judges had broad discretion to consider facts at sentencing.
Instead, at the Founding, judges had virtually no discretion at sentenc-
ing but were obliged to impose sentences based solely on the offense
of conviction.
120
117 Justice Stevens has relied on a slightly different rationale in rejecting double jeop-
ardy challenges to recidivism enhancements-that a defendant's prior crimes are a permis-
sible sentencing consideration because they provide the sentencing court with important
information about the defendant's character. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389,
409-10 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to jus-
tice Stevens, a sentence is "determined in part by the character of the offense and in part
by the character of the offender," and those character determinations do not implicate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. But, Justice Stevens warns, the Double Jeopardy Clause pro-
hibits enhancements based on "the offense as aggravation of the underlying offense," be-
cause in that situation, "the defendant is being punished for having committed the offense
at issue, and not for what the commission of that offense reveals about his character." In
such cases, the "defendant has been 'put in jeopardy' of punishment for the offense be-
cause he has in fact been punished for that offense." Id. at 410.
Justice Stevens is not alone in attempting to distinguish between punishing recidivists
based on their character and punishing them based on their actions. A number of retribu-
tivists have argue that recidivism enhancements are justified under a theory of punishment
based on choice, as opposed to merely punishment based on character. See, e.g., Andrew
von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REv. 591, 605, 619
(1981). But neither Justice Stevens nor the retributivists seem to be able to sustain the
distinction. See Witte, 515 U.S. at 402-03 (critiquing Justice Stevens' analysis); Hessick,
supra note 58, at 1143-46 (critiquing von Hirsch). In any event, whether a defendant is
subject to additional punishment because her previous crimes provide information about
her character or whether they simply provide information about her past misdeeds, the
fact remains that the information being considered are the crimes themselves. The defen-
dant is being punished multiple times for committing one crime; double jeopardy prohib-
its the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense, regardless of whether the
government has some alternative explanation for why it is punishing an individual a sec-
ond time. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 85 ("The Constitution's limitations re-
strict the government regardless of its ultimate aim.").
118 Williams was overruled in the death penalty context by Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 362 (1977) and superseded by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e) in the
non-death penalty context.
119 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
120 Id. at 478-81. While Apprendi and its progeny seem to reject the historical account
in Williams of sentencing practices at the Founding, a recent Supreme Court decision re-
garding district court discretion under the post-Booker advisory Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines quoted language from the Williams opinion that emphasized:
both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in
this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing
judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence
used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be
imposed within limits fixed by law.
Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011) (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 246).
The recent opinion did not discuss any of the historical precedent cited in Apprendi,
but instead relied on Williams and other pre-Apprendi cases for the proposition that "It has
been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to
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More important, allowing the goal of individualized sentencing to
trump constitutional rights turns constitutional law on its head. It is a
basic principle of constitutional law that the government cannot ig-
nore the Constitution simply because it impedes the government from
accomplishing some goal. Thus, the general need for information
about a defendant to impose an individualized sentence does notjus-
iff! the refusal to recognize double jeopardy rights at sentencing. In-
deed, courts themselves have recognized that information
maximization does not trump all constitutional rights, holding that
the Constitution forbids certain considerations-such as race, ethnic-
ity, and gender-from influencing a sentence.
12 1
Finally, the refusal to recognize double jeopardy's application at
sentencing allows the government to circumvent not only the restric-
tions on multiple punishments but also the restriction on multiple
prosecutions. For example, because double jeopardy is held not to
apply at sentencing, courts have permitted prosecutors to seek in-
creased sentences based on criminal conduct for which a defendant
has been acquitted. 122 Refusing to recognize double jeopardy at sen-
tencing provides a means for the government to seek punishment for
a defendant's alleged offense without formally relitigating the defen-
dant's guilt or innocence. It also permits the government to seek ad-
ditional punishment at trial for a crime that the defendant has not yet
been charged with, 123 and then permits the government to bring such
charges and obtain a formal conviction and a second punishment at a
later date. 124 The consequence of failing to recognize the applicabil-
ity of the Double Jeopardy Clause at sentencing is not simply that the
consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the
human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punish-
ment to ensue." Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1239-40 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81,
113 (1996)). We have not conducted our own independent historical research to deter-
mine which of the Court's accounts of sentencing practices at the Founding is accurate.
121 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 54-56 (collecting sources); see also Pepper, 131
S. Ct. at 1240 n.8 (noting that "sentencing courts' discretion... is subject to constitutional
constraints").
122 See Lear, supra note 108, at 1181-82. A number of jurisdictions permit the consid-
eration at sentencing of criminal conduct for which a jury entered an acquittal. See, e.g.,
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156-57 (1997) (per curiam); People v. Dunlap, No.
217123, 2001 WL 776752, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App.Jan. 16, 2001) (per curiam); State v. Clark,
197 S.W.3d 598, 602 (Mo. 2006) (en banc); State v. Winfield, 23 S.W.3d 279, 282-83
(Tenn. 2000). In those jurisdictions, when a defendant is found not guilty of the charged
crime, if the jury convicted on any charge, the judge is permitted to increase the defen-
dant's sentence based on the crimes for which she was acquitted.
123 See Lear, supra note 108, at 1182-83. Sentencing increases based on uncharged
conduct or arrests that did not result in conviction are common. See, e.g., Williams, 337
U.S. at 244; State v. Green, 303 A.2d 312, 320-23, 325 (N.J. 1973); State v. Carico, 968
S.W.2d 280, 287-88 (Tenn. 1998).
124 See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 412 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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government may avoid the restriction on double jeopardy during that
particular proceeding; it allows the government to seek punishment




CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON PUNISHMENT
What should be clear at this point is that the Double Jeopardy
Clause ought to be interpreted to place meaningful limits on multiple
punishments. Doing so is consistent with the logic and history of the
Clause. A further reason to read the Clause as significantly limiting
multiple punishments is that current double jeopardy doctrine is in-
consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the Eighth
Amendment's limit on cruel and unusual punishment.
126
As with the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court has consistently
rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to enhanced sentences for re-
cidivists. 127 But the Court has done so on grounds that directly con-
flict with the reasoning underlying the Court's rejection of Double
Jeopardy challenges to those same enhancements. That the Court has
125 For example, courts have routinely rejected challenges to increasing punishment
for acquitted conduct, see Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 58, sometimes explicitly rely-
ing on the idea that the imposition of punishment need not satisfy the procedural require-
ments of a trial. See, e.g., Watts, 519 U.S. at 155-57 ("The Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate the significance of the different standards of proof that govern at trial and sen-
tencing. We have explained that 'acquittal on criminal charges does not prove that the
defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt."' (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361
(1984))); United States v. Milton, 27 F.3d 203, 208-09 (6th Cir. 1994) ("This circuit clearly
allows district courts to consider acquitted conduct at sentencing .... under the theory
that a determination of guilt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt while sentencing
considerations only require proof by a preponderance of the evidence." (citations
omitted)).
126 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
127 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
U.S. 63, 77 (2003); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980). The Court's repeated
failure to find that harsh noncapital sentences run afoul of the Eighth Amendment has led
some commentators to despair over whether the Eighth Amendment continues to operate
as anything more than a rhetorical limit on legislative power. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow,
The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for
Uniformity, 107 MIcH. L. Rxv. 1145, 1156 (2009) ("[T]he Court has been steadfast in its
refusal to police disproportionate sentences outside the capital context."); Youngjae Lee,
The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REv. 677, 695 (2005) (arguing
that the Court's decision in Ewing "all but defines the right against excessive punishment
out of existence"); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a
Wall? The Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More
Broadly, 11 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 155, 184 (2008) ("[T]he Court's non-capital proportionality
doctrine [has] bec[o]me more limited in its scope of relevant considerations and so defer-
ential to state interests as to make Eighth Amendment challenges to excessive incarcera-
tion essentially non-starters,").
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resorted to these inconsistencies suggests that its rejection of chal-
lenges to multiple punishments lacks a foundation.
This Part explores the intersection of double jeopardy and
Eighth Amendment doctrine. It begins by identifying the conflict be-
tween the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Eighth Amendment in the
context of recidivism enhancements. It then explains that, given the
current inability of Eighth Amendment proportionality review to as-
sess recidivism enhancements and other punishment practices that
are predicated on utilitarian crime-control concerns, the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause appears to be the best vehicle for placing constitutional
limits on punishment aimed at recidivism. This Part concludes by
sketching a framework that would permit legislatures to enact legisla-
tion aimed at recidivism while, at the same time, ensuring that the
Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition on multiple punishments pro-
vides some constitutional limit on recidivism enhancements.
A. Inconsistency Between Double Jeopardy and the Eighth
Amendment
As currently interpreted, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
bar legislatures from prescribing multiple punishments, 128 including
punishments aimed specifically at recidivists. In so concluding, the
Supreme Court has explained that a sentencing enhancement for a
prior conviction is not a second punishment for the prior offense. In-
stead, it is a punishment only for the instant crime of conviction. As
the Court has put it, the enhancement reflects "the manner in which
[the defendant] committed the crime of conviction."'
129
The Double Jeopardy Clause is not the only constitutional provi-
sion under which defendants have challenged recidivism enhance-
ments. They have also invoked the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment. 130 According to the Court, a pun-
ishment violates the Eighth Amendment if it is disproportionate to
the defendant's crime. The three factors used to determine whether a
sentence is so disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment
are: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction;
and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions."'13 1 The Court does not require "strict proportion-
128 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
129 Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting
Watts, 519 U.S. at 154); see also Witte, 515 U.S. at 398 (noting that in determining the
proper sentence a judge is entitled to consider the circumstances of the crime at issue,
including a separate crime of which the defendant was convicted).
130 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
131 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). The EwingCourt seems to have endorsed
the continuing validity of these factors. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 22. But see Barkow, supra
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ality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme
sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime."'
132
As with the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court has nearly always
rejected Eighth Amendment challenges claiming that lengthy
sentences for recidivists are disproportionate. 33 In doing so, the
Court has adopted reasoning that directly conflicts with the reasoning
in its double jeopardy decisions. When addressing Eighth Amend-
ment challenges, the Court has explained that the increased sentence
is not solely attributable to the latest offense of conviction, but is
based in part on the defendant's prior convictions. Ewing v. Califor-
nia'34 provides an example. That case involved a challenge to Califor-
nia's Three Strikes Law, which prescribes a life sentence for a
defendant convicted of her third serious felony. 135 Ewing was con-
victed of stealing three golf clubs. 136 Although theft ordinarily carries
a penalty of no more than three years, Ewing was sentenced to life
imprisonment because the theft was his third serious felony.137 Ewing
argued that the sentence of life imprisonment was a disproportion-
ately harsh punishment for stealing golf clubs, and thus violated the
Eighth Amendment. The Court rejected this argument, commenting
that Ewing had "incorrectly frame[d] the issue."' 3 The Court ex-
plained that the proportionality of Ewing's sentence depended not
only on the seriousness of his "triggering offense"-stealing the golf
clubs-but also on his previous convictions.'
39
By considering not only the crime underlying the present convic-
tion but also the previous convictions, the Court's proportionality
note 127, at 1157 n.61 (suggesting that Justice Kennedy's concurrence from Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), has displaced the three-part test from Solem); Lee, supra
note 127, at 693-94 (arguing Justice Kennedy's Harmelin concurrence made the second
and third steps of the Solem inquiry discretionary).
132 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (KennedyJ, concurring).
133 "There has been only a single case in the Court's history in which a term of incar-
ceration, standing alone, was held to be disproportionate to an otherwise validly defined
crime." Barkow, supra note 127, at 1160 (referring to Solem, 463 U.S. at 303, in which the
Court rejected as unconstitutional a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of pa-
role for a defendant who had six prior nonviolent felonies and who wrote a "no-account"
check for $100).
134 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003).
135 Id. at 16.
136 Id. at 18-19.
137 Id. at 20.
138 Id. at 28.
139 Id. ("The gravity of his offense was not merely 'shoplifting three golf clubs.'
Rather, Ewing was convicted of felony grand theft for stealing nearly $1,200 worth of mer-
chandise after previously having been convicted of at least two 'violent' or 'serious' felo-
nies."); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980) (holding that "[i]n this case,
however, we need not decide whether Texas could impose a life sentence upon Rummel
merely for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses," because "at the time that he obtained the
$120.75 by false pretenses, he already had committed and had been imprisoned for two
other felonies").
[Vol. 97:45
20111 DOUBLE JEOPARDY AS A LIMIT ON PUNISHMENT 75
analysis is inconsistent with its statements in the double jeopardy con-
text that recidivist penalties do not punish offenders for their previous
crimes. 140 These inconsistent approaches to recidivism statutes result
in virtually no constitutional limit on the punishments that may be
assessed against recidivists. They establish a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose
situation for the government. Instead of protecting an individual's
right against multiple or excessive punishments, the conflicting doc-
trines maximize the ability of the government to punish individuals.
Given the inconsistencies in the theories underlying the Court's
Eighth Amendment and double jeopardy decisions, one of those lines
of decisions must be incorrect. Either recidivism enhancements do
punish for past offenses and consequently should be barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause, or they do not and consequently should re-
ceive more stringent review under the Eighth Amendment.
B. Implementing Double Jeopardy as a Limit on Punishment
It is, of course, possible to restore constitutional limits on punish-
ment by more rigorously policing incarceration sentences under the
Eighth Amendment. Many commentators have suggested such an ap-
proach.141 And the Supreme Court's recent decision in Graham v.
Florida,142 which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sen-
tence of life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide
crimes, may signal that the Court will be amenable to more robustly
enforcing the Eight Amendment in future non-death penalty
cases.' 4
3
But double jeopardy's prohibition on multiple punishments plays
a different role from the Eighth Amendment's limit on excessive pun-
ishments. The Eighth Amendment does not categorically forbid re-
cidivism enhancements. Rather, it precludes only those sentences
that constitute excessive punishment. The Double Jeopardy Clause,
by contrast, places a limit on all multiple punishments.1 44 Accord-
ingly, merely altering the Eighth Amendment doctrine to account for
recidivism enhancements would not necessarily result in constitu-
tional review of all multiple punishments.
140 See supra notes 102 & 129 and accompanying text.
141 E.g., Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 571, 634-35 (2005); King,
supra note 83, at 125-26; Klein, supra note 81, at 1006; Poulin, supra note 9, at 598-99;
Thomas, supra note 25, at 838; Westen & Drubel, supra note 77, at 114.
142 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
143 See id. at 2033-34. The Court's Eighth Amendment review in capital cases has been
far more searching than in noncapital cases. See Barkow, supra note 127, at 1155-62.
144 A single act may violate multiple constitutional provisions. For instance, prohibit-
ing an individual from expressing political opinions because of her race violates both the
First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.
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Moreover, extending the Eighth Amendment to limit recidivism
enhancements would require substantial reworking of Eighth Amend-
ment doctrine. The Court's Eighth Amendment proportionality test
appears to be incapable of evaluating punishments aimed specifically
at recidivists. Proportionality is a retributive concept. 45 It measures
punishment based on the defendant's culpability and the harm
caused by her acts.146 But recidivism enhancements are not generally
justified in retributive terms.1 47 Instead, the primary justification for
increased punishment aimed at recidivism is the utilitarian argument
that they reduce future crimes by repeat offenders through deter-
rence or incapacitation. 148
To be sure, the Supreme Court has stated that its Eighth Amend-
ment proportionality review also takes account of "the State's public-
safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons. ' 149 But
as others have noted, including deterrence and incapacitation as con-
siderations renders proportionality review nonsensical.150 Whether a
145 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Proportionality-
the notion that the punishment should fit the crime-is inherently a concept tied to the
penological goal of retribution."); see also Lee, supra note 127, at 734 ("Some may argue
that the Ewing Court remained within the proportionality framework and merely applied
an extremely deferential version of the proportionality test, but given the emphasis the
Court placed on California's deterrence and incapacitation rationales in virtually every
paragraph of the opinion, it is impossible to read the opinion in that way.").
146 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 461 (1978); Andrew Ashworth,
Desert, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 181, 182 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds.,
1992).
147 But see U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 41 (1987), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf-lib/
Supplementary%20Report.pdf ("From a just punishment perspective, a defendant with a
criminal history is deemed more culpable and deserving of greater punishment than a first
offender."); Lee, supra note 8, at 621 (articulating a retributive justification for recidivism
enhancements); von Hirsch, supra note 117, at 593 (same).
148 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 147, at 41 ("Enhancing a defendant's
sentence on the basis of a criminal history furthers the crime control goals of general and
specific deterrence, and incapacitation."); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness:
Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1429, 1435-38 (2001)
(explaining why current recidivism enhancement regimes are explainable only under a
utilitarian rationale); Turner et al., supra note 42, at 16 (identifying the policy behind
three strikes legislation across the country as incapacitation); Michael Vitiello, California's
Three Strikes and We're Out: Was Judicial Activism California's Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
1025, 1071-72 (2004) (noting that recidivist statutes are utilitarian rather than
retributivist).
149 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29; see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980) ("[T]he
interest of the State of Texas here is not simply that of making criminal the unlawful acqui-
sition of another person's property; it is in addition the interest, expressed in all recidivist
statutes, in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have
shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established
by its criminal law.").
150 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[I]t becomes
difficult even to speak intelligently of 'proportionality,' once deterrence and rehabilitation
are given significant weight [ ]-not to mention giving weight to the purpose of Califor-
nia's Three Strikes Law: incapacitation." (citation omitted) (quoting Harmelin v. Michi-
20111 DOUBLE JEOPARDY AS A LIMIT ON PUNISHMENT 77
defendant would abstain from committing another crime because he
is incapacitated or deterred is irrelevant to whether the punishment is
proportionate to the crime. That is not to say that one cannot articu-
late a theory of excessive punishment under utilitarian punishment
theories of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.'15 But such
a theory would not be based on proportionality. Thus, before the
Eighth Amendment could impose any real limits on recidivism en-
hancements, the Court would have to rework its Eighth Amendment
doctrine to determine whether and how to incorporate these utilita-
rian concerns.
15 2
gan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991))); see also Lee, supra note 127, at 732 (noting that the
Harmelin Court "starts out with a statement that grossly disproportionate sentences are un-
constitutional but ends with a non sequitur that what really matters is whether 'the
law . . . has [any] chance of success' for deterrence purposes" (omission and alteration in
original) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1008)).
151 See Lee, supra note 127, at 738-39. At least one commentator has argued that "a
requirement of proportionality is consistent with the penological goals of deterrence, inca-
pacitation, and rehabilitation." Ian P. Farrell, Gilbert & Sullivan and Scalia: Philosophy, Pro-
portionality, and the Eighth Amendment, 55 VILL. L. REg. 321, 323 (2010). By their own terms,
utilitarian theories of punishment place limits on excessive punishment-" [p]unishment is
justified only to the extent that the positive consequences outweigh the negative." Id. at
343. But the mere fact that utilitarian punishment theories place limits on punishment
does not mean that those punishments incorporate a proportionality principle-at least
not the sort of proportionality contemplated in the Court's Eighth Amendment cases. A
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis may result in punishment decisions that do not coincide
with the gravity of an offender's crime. See Lee, supra note 127, at 739 ("[G]iven two
crimes of differing seriousness, A and B, there is no requirement within the utilitarian
framework that whichever is the more serious crime will be punished more harshly, If A
causes the harm of one hundred units and B causes the harm of two hundred units, the
utilitarian theory would favor punishing B more harshly than A sometimes, but not other
times; it depends as much on the probability of conviction as on the seriousness of the
crimes."). The Court's Eighth Amendment cases clearly contemplate a proportionality
analysis based on the gravity of an offender's crime. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 ("We
first address the gravity of the offense compared to the harshness of the penalty."); Solem,
463 U.S. at 290 ("[W]e hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be
proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted.").
152 At present, the Court does not seem to have incorporated these utilitarian con-
cerns into its review of sentences; rather, it has simply deferred to the states' selection
between multiple theories of punishment. For example, the Court in Ewing stated:
A sentence can have a variety ofjustifications, such as incapacitation, deter-
rence, retribution, or rehabilitation. Some or all of these justifications may
play a role in a State's sentencing scheme. Selecting the sentencing ratio-
nales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not fed-
eral courts .... We do not sit as a 'superlegislature' to second-guess these
policy choices. It is enough that the State of California has a reasonable
basis for believing that dramatically enhanced sentences for habitual felons
Iadvance[s] [sic] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any substantial
way.'
538 U.S. 25, 29 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. at 297 n.22). As Youngjae Lee has noted, this analysis in Ewing is problematic because
it "dictates that the analysis come to an end if a legitimate purpose of punishment is ad-
vanced, period. In other words, [this analysis] essentially dissolves the constraint part of
the goal-constraint framework that characterizes much of the Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence." See Lee, supra note 127, at 737.
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What is more, even if the Court excluded these utilitarian con-
cerns and conducted its proportionality test based solely on retributiv-
ism, it is unclear how the Court would engage in proportionality
review of recidivism enhancements. 153 Those retributivists who sup-
port longer sentences for recidivists do so on the theory that a repeat
offender is more culpable than a first-time offender. 154 But while
making a comparative culpability assessment of recidivists and first-
time offenders may be possible, quantifying that difference in culpa-
bility and translating the difference into an amount of punishment
are difficult to do. t55 A prior conviction does not suggest a set
amount of additional culpability for his second crime; culpability de-
pends on the circumstances of that crime.
156
Nor is reworking the proportionality standard all that would be
necessary to create an Eighth Amendment doctrine that could serve as
a constitutional limit on punishment for recidivists. Current doctrine
does not appear to provide for any meaningful judicial review of pun-
ishments. The Court has said that a punishment comports with the
Eighth Amendment so long as the government "has a reasonable basis
for believing" that the sentence will "advance[ ] the goals of [its] crim-
153 Notably, in Ewing"[n]o one argue [d] for Ewing's inclusion within the ambit of the
three strikes statute on grounds of 'retribution."' 538 U.S. at 51-52 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
154 For academic accounts of how a theory of retributivism supports higher sentences
for recidivists than for first-time offenders, see Lee, supra note 8, at 586-89; von Hirsch,
supra note 117, at 597-604. For its part, the Supreme Court has stated that "the repetition
of criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies heavier penalties when they are
again convicted." Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912). Many retributivists
have disputed that retribution supports recidivism enhancements. See, e.g., FLETCHER,
supra note 146, at 460-66; RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUAL,
ITY AND DESERT 67-74 (1979); Alexis M. Durham III, Justice in Sentencing: The Role of Prior
Record of Criminal Involvement, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 614, 620-21 (1987); Ekow N.
Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral
Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 1019, 1029-37 (2004).
155 See supra note 1. For example, Paul Robinson has noted:
By committing an offense after a previous conviction, an offender might be
seen as 'thumbing his nose' at the justice system. Such disregard mayjustify
some incremental increase in punishment over that deserved by a first-time
offender, but it seems difficult to justify the doubling, tripling, or quadru-
pling of punishment because of nose-thumbing.
Robinson, supra note 148, at 1436.
156 See Roberts, supra note 9, at 325 ("A [sentencing] guideline system that simply as-
signed criminal history scores on the basis of the raw number of previous convictions
would be crude, indeed, and would not follow theoretical principles relating to desert or
dangerousness."). Some critics have made this argument in opposition to the recidivism
penalties imposed in a number ofjurisdictions. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 64,
at 72 (criticizing the relevance of prior convictions under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines because they fail to capture the difference in culpability regarding when the prior
convictions occurred and whether the prior conviction "has any relation to the current
offense"); Roberts, supra note 9, at 331 (critiquing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
failing to consider the degree of similarity between previous and current offenses).
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inal justice system in any substantial way."' 57 For the Eighth Amend-
ment to impose any real limitations on punishment, the Court would
have to adopt something less deferential than this low-level rational
basis review.158 Indeed, even outside of the recidivism context, the
Court probably should reconsider the rational basis test for Eighth
Amendment claims given that that test runs counter to the general
principle that claims of individual rights violations must be protected
by something more than rational basis review. 159 In short, the Eighth
Amendment doctrine is currently ill-equipped to handle recidivism
enhancements and would require a wholesale restructuring to do so.
By contrast, courts could develop doctrine regarding recidivism
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition on mul-
tiple punishments with relative ease. Fashioning this doctrine would
not require the courts to unravel an entire existing doctrine, as would
using the Eighth Amendment. The Court has failed to develop a doc-
trine relating to double jeopardy at sentencing, and so it would be
writing on a blank slate. Moreover, because there is no underlying
doctrine based on retributivism, the prohibition on multiple punish-
ments is not fundamentally incompatible with the utilitarian crime-
control concepts underlying recidivism enhancements.1 60 Nor would
a double jeopardy limit on multiple punishments require courts to
assess whether a recidivism enhancement is permissibly proportional
to the crime. Rather, courts would simply ask whether a second pun-
ishment is being imposed for the same offense; if it is, then that en-
hancement triggers double jeopardy protection.
To be sure, many people are bound to argue that prohibiting
recidivism enhancements overly constricts the legislature's power to
deal with crime. Prior convictions are widely believed to provide rele-
vant information about a defendant's future behavior. 161 As a group,
those individuals who have previously committed a crime are more
likely to commit future crimes than those who have not.162 For this
157 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (second alteration in original) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 297
n.22).
158 See Lee, supra note 127, at 741-42 (suggesting that the test is akin to rational basis).
159 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 148-52 (discussing how utilitarian crime-control
concepts are inconsistent with the Eight Amendment's retributive proportionality
doctrine).
161 See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397-99 (1995); Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994).
162 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTA-
TION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 10 (2004) [hereinafter MEASURING RECIDI-
ViSM], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research-Publications/Recidivism/2004
05_RecidivismCriminalHistory.pdf; see also ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 7 (1989) [hereinafter
RECIDIVISM 1983], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf ("The
percents of those rearrested among released prisoners were systematically related to the
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reason, courts and others have insisted that recidivism enhancements
are necessary to deter future lawbreaking. 16 3 They have also argued
that repeated lawbreaking requires incapacitation or rehabilitation
through longer sentences in order to protect public safety.
16 4
But the mere fact that the government has a good reason to im-
pose recidivism enhancements does not necessarily overcome the
Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition on multiple punishments. Even
though, as a group, prior offenders may be more likely to commit
future offenses than those who have not previously committed an of-
fense, that predilection does not automatically justify empowering the
government to impose higher punishments on recidivists. Even if in-
creased sentences would result in reduced crime, that reduction must
be weighed against the cost of sacrificing the right against multiple
punishments.
This sort of balance explains why race and gender, for example,
are not permissible sentencing considerations. Studies show that
blacks are more likely to recidivate than whites,1 65 and that men are
extensiveness of the prior records."); Martin Wasik, Desert and the Role of Previous Convictions,
in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 146, at 233, 235 ("The research evidence is that the
more convictions recorded against a defendant, the greater the likelihood that he will be
reconvicted.").
163 See, e.g., Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992) ("States have a valid interest in
deterring and segregating habitual criminals."); Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Con-
duct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 99, 127
(1996) ("If a review of the defendant's record shows that he is an inveterate recidivist-
that he has a strong and enduring inclination to break the law-then that fact shows that
previous intervention by the state has not deterred him from criminal activity and that
more severe punishment is warranted in order to deter him from future criminal
conduct.").
164 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) ("When the California Legisla-
ture enacted the three strikes law, it made a judgment that protecting the public safety
requires incapacitating criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or
violent crime."); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 430 (1974) (holding that Con-
gress could reasonably conclude that persons with two or more prior felony convictions
were less likely to be rehabilitated than those with less than two prior convictions). Courts
have also on occasion framed the justification for recidivism enhancements in retributive
terms. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1997) (per curiam).
165 MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 162, at 12 ("[T]he race of the offender is associ-
ated with recidivism rates. Overall, Black offenders are more likely to recidivate (32.8%)
than are Hispanic offenders (24.3%). White offenders are the least likely to recidivate
(16.0%)."); see also PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 7 (2002) [hereinafter RECIDIVISM 1994], availa-
ble at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf (noting that blacks were more
likely than whites to recidivate (28.5% versus 22.6%)); MILES D. HARER, FED. BUREAU OF
PRISONS, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987 2 (1994), available at
http://www.bop.gov/news/research-projects/published-reports/recidivism/oreprrecid
87.pdf [hereinafter RECIDIVISM 1987] ("Recidivism rates were higher among blacks and His-
panics than among whites and non-Hispanics .... "); RECIDIVISM 1983, supra note 162, at 5
("Blacks had slightly higher recidivism rates than whites, approximately 5 to 8 percentage
points higher for each measure.").
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more likely to recidivate than women. 16 6 But those considerations are
not permitted to play a role in sentencing determinations because,
even though an offender's race or gender may provide information
about her statistical likelihood to recidivate, the government's interest
in preventing crime is not as important as the individual's interest in
equal protection under law.' 6 7 This point is easily generalized to
other constitutional rights that limit the government's ability to ac-
complish its goals. For example, the right to a jury trial impairs the
government's ability to punish those who have committed crimes.'
68
The reason we nonetheless retain the jury trial right is that the inter-
est underlying the right-protecting against arbitrary government ac-
tion by requiring the government to prove its case to a group of
disinterested citizens' 69-is more significant than the government's
interest in convicting all guilty defendants.
170
Of course, in those instances where the costs of upholding a con-
stitutional right are intolerably high because of the harm to society,
the government's interest may trump the constitutional right. Courts
have developed a number of doctrinal tests under which rights yield
when the social costs of enforcing those rights are too high compared
to the interests protected by them.1 71 For example, under the strict
scrutiny doctrine, courts will allow the government to infringe on even
166 See MEASURING RECIDMSM, supra note 162, at 11; see also REcIDIVIsM 1994, supra note
165, at 7 (noting that men were more likely than women to recidivate (26.2% versus
17.3%)); RECIDVISM 1983, supra note 162, at 5 ("Men were more likely than women to be
rearrested, reconvicted, and reincarcerated after their release from prison."). But see RE-
CIDlVISM 1987, supra note 165, at 3 ("Recidivism rates were almost the same for males and
females; 40.9 percent of the males recidivated compared to 39.7 percent of the females.").
167 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 81-83.
168 Indeed, in the very case in which the Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment
right to ajury trial in criminal cases applied to the states, it acknowledged the "weaknesses
and the potential for misuse" of the process. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156
(1968).
169 Cf Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of theJury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 405
(2009) (noting that the Sixth Amendment includes both an individual procedural right as
well as a communal right to "decid[e] punishment for criminal offenders and... to deter-
mine moral blameworthiness").
170 There are similar explanations for other constitutional rights. Consider the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. A particularly barbaric
punishment might be necessary to achieve optimal deterrence, but the punishment is for-
bidden because of our society's respect for human dignity and its revulsion at such punish-
ments. Nor is the idea limited to constitutional protections. For example, Federal Rule of
Evidence 404 generally prohibits the admission of prior bad acts to prove that the defen-
dant has a propensity to commit crimes. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith."). But given that prior offenders are more likely to commit
future offenses, evidence of prior offenses may be probative. Nevertheless, the evidence is
prohibited to protect the more important interest that an individual not be convicted
based on a prior offense.
171 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 8, at 90-91.
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fundamental rights if necessary to protect a compelling public
interest. 172
But there is reason to doubt that many current recidivism en-
hancements meet such a heightened threshold. Although promoting
public safety through the reduction of crime is undoubtedly a compel-
ling public interest,173 it is less clear whether recidivism enhance-
ments are narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of crime reduction
and thus ought to outweigh the constitutional prohibition on multiple
punishments. Strict scrutiny requires courts to prioritize government
interests over individual rights only to the extent necessary to avoid
intolerable costs. To be sure, prior offenders appear to be more likely
to commit future offenses as a class. But not all prior offenders pre-
sent the same threat. Indeed, there is some data suggesting that an
individual's age may be a better predictor of recidivism than prior
convictions, 174 so older offenders do not pose the same risk as
younger offenders. 175 And logic alone tells us that those who were
previously convicted of shoplifting may be more likely to offend again
than those who engaged in mortgage fraud. Current laws often fail to
draw these distinctions and instead call for increased punishments for
all or most prior crimes.
176
Nor is punishment calibrated to accomplish the marginal deter-
rence or incapacitation necessary to offset the increased likelihood
that the offender will offend again. Take California's Three Strikes
172 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267, 1306-08
(2007).
173 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) ("The legitimate and compelling state
interest in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
174 RECIDIVISM 1983, supra note 162, at 11 ("[A]ge when released is found to have the
largest impact [on re-arrest odds], followed by the number of prior arrests .... The
contribution to the predicted log odds of rearrest by prisoners who were age 24 or younger
(.721) is larger than that by those with 7 or more prior arrests (.694) .... ").
That age is a better predictor of recidivism than prior convictions may also be relevant
for strict scrutiny analysis. See Fallon, supra note 172, at 1327 (noting that while the Su-
preme Court often emphasizes that "governmental infringements on fundamental rights
must not be 'underinclusive"' and that its suspicion toward underinclusive laws may "re-
flect[ ] an insistence that the government not infringe on rights when doing so will predict-
ably fail to achieve purportedly justifying goals," this does not mean "that every
underinclusive statute is therefore necessarily unconstitutional").
175 "Among all offenders under age 21, the recidivism rate is 35.5 percent, while of-
fenders over age 50 have a recidivism rate of 9.5 percent." MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra
note 162, at 12.
176 While some jurisdictions distinguish between offenders based on the precise nature
of the previous felonies, see Austin, et al., supra note 63, at 134-37, there are a number of
jurisdictions that increase sentences for recidivists without making such distinctions, see,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-9 (LexisNexis 1995); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(3)(4) (2010);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.525 (West 2010);
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2010).
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Law. 1 77 A sentence of life imprisonment for a third felony is likely
harsher than necessary to prevent some, if not all, offenders from
committing future crimes. In other words, the infringement on the
double jeopardy rights of recidivists seem much higher than necessary
to accomplish the government's goal of crime prevention, and thus
the law is likely not justified.
1 78
Of course, the absence of reliable data about the interaction of
penalty increases, recidivism, and crime prevention may be attributa-
ble to the fact that current doctrine does not call for this sort of bal-
ancing in making double jeopardy determinations. 179 Courts rarely
consider the government's interest in assessing whether a prosecution
or punishment is permitted under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 180 In-
stead, courts ask simply whether the prosecution (or, in limited cir-
cumstances, the punishment) is for the same offense as an earlier one.
177 A number of states have enacted three strikes laws. See supra notes 61-63.
178 See Fallon, supra note 172, at 1328-29 (describing how overinclusive statutes often
fail strict scrutiny analysis); cf United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010)
(stating that the government failed to carry its burden in the intermediate scrutiny context
where "[t]he government has offered numerous plausible reasons why the disarmament of
domestic violence misdemeanants is substantially related to an important government
goal; however, it has not attempted to offer sufficient evidence to establish a substantial
relationship between § 922(g) (9) and an important governmental goal"); Wessmann v.
Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 804 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting anecdotal evidence and requiring
statistical evidence to satisfy strict scrutiny).
179 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 144 (1986) (recognizing "the empirical compo-
nent" of strict scrutiny). Even if the courts were to recognize that the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects against recidivism enhancements, it is not clear what empirical showing the
government would have to demonstrate in order to satisfy strict scrutiny. See Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) ("The quantum of empirical evidence
needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down
with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised."). There is ample empirical
evidence demonstrating that those with prior convictions are as a group more likely to
reoffend. See sources cited supra note 162. But cases suggest that a challenge to recidivism
enhancements is more likely to succeed if the defendant points to empirical evidence that
contradicts or complicates the recidivism question. See, e.g., Nixon, 528 U.S. at 394 ("There
might, of course, be need for a more extensive evidentiary documentation if respondents
had made any showing of their own to cast doubt on the apparent implications of Buckley's
evidence and the record here .... "); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S.
425, 438-39 (2002) (making a similar observation in the intermediate scrutiny context).
180 One notable exception to this general practice is in the context of mistrials. If a
court declares a mistrial, a subsequent prosecution will be prohibited unless "manifest ne-
cessity" requires a second prosecution. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982);
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
579, 580 (1824). That standard balances the defendant's interests under the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause against "the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments."
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949); see also Westen, supra note 71, at 1036 (charac-
terizing the Double Jeopardy Clause as "represent[ing] a 'balancing' of the defendant's
interest in finality against 'the societal interest in [law enforcement]'" (second alteration
in original) (quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964))).
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This lack of doctrinal nuance may explain the courts' refusal to pro-
tect meaningfully against multiple punishments.1 81
CONCLUSION
Prior convictions are a well-accepted sentencing factor in today's
sentencing systems. But the acceptance of the practice does not make
it constitutional. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple pun-
ishments for a single offense, and this prohibition restricts the govern-
ment's ability to enhance criminal sentences based on an offender's
prior conviction.
The current trend of conceptualizing the Double Jeopardy
Clause as providing robust limits only on multiple prosecutions, as op-
posed to multiple punishments, neglects the animating reason for the
Clause: to prevent the government from having multiple opportuni-
ties to impose punishments on an individual. Prohibiting multiple
prosecutions is a poor tool for achieving that goal in today's legal sys-
tem. Although it limits the government's power to seek punishment
through new criminal charges, it does nothing to stop the government
from accomplishing the same ends through sentencing enhance-
ments based on prior convictions. What is more, the same doctrines
that have permitted sentencing increases for recidivists have also pro-
vided an end run around some of the principles underlying the prohi-
bition against multiple prosecutions. In particular, those doctrines
have permitted the government to seek sentencing increases based on
conduct for which a defendant has already been acquitted.18 2
Accepting that the Double Jeopardy Clause limits the imposition
of multiple punishments does not necessarily spell the doom of all
recidivism enhancements. Courts could develop a doctrine that si-
multaneously protects double jeopardy's limitation on multiple pun-
ishments and accommodates the government's interest in protecting
the public from repeat offenders. For example, courts might employ
something akin to strict scrutiny, which permits infringements of fun-
damental rights where the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling government interest.18 3 The prevention of crime is generally
181 If current double jeopardy doctrine were more nuanced and permitted the balanc-
ing of governmental and defendant interests, courts might be more receptive to recogniz-
ing that recidivism enhancements constitute multiple punishments. Cf. DarylJ. Levinson,
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 857, 884-85 (1999) (dis-
cussing the concept of remedial deterrence and noting that in some instances "the threat
of undesirable remedial consequences motivat[es] courts to construct... right[s] in such a
way as to avoid those consequences").
182 See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
183 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715-16 (1977).
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seen as a compelling government interest, 184 and if prosecutors can
adequately demonstrate that particular past offenses accurately pre-
dict whether a person will offend again, then recidivism statutes may
be appropriate-at least in some circumstances.
That said, it is difficult to believe that past offenses are a good
predictor of future offenses in many individual cases. In fact, there
are a number of factors other than prior convictions that are corre-
lated with likelihood of recidivism.1 8 5 Nor is it clear that recidivism
enhancements have been precisely tailored to accomplish the goal of
reducing recidivism. 186 Some recidivism laws undoubtedly provide for
more punishment than is necessary to stop a particular defendant
from reoffending. For example, although there is ample evidence
that even career offenders tend to stop committing crimes as they get
older, a number of states incarcerate third-time offenders for life. 187
And recidivism laws doubtlessly affect more individuals than necessary
to prevent future crimes. Even though, as a group, individuals with
prior convictions recidivate at a higher rate than first time offenders, a
sizable percentage does not reoffend.1
88
The consequences of restricting recidivism enhancements are dif-
ficult to predict. Prohibiting sentencing enhancements for prior con-
184 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (identifying the prevention of crime
as a compelling interest).
185 See MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 162, at 11-13 (noting a relationship between
recidivism rates and gender, age, race, employment status, educational attainment, marital
status, and illicit drug use); see also Hessick, supra note 58, at 1140-41 (noting that "[t] here
are many other reliable recidivism predictors in addition to prior convictions that modern
sentencing systems, including the federal system, do not currently consider as appropriate
sentencing factors," and surmising that "[t]he decision not to use these factors in sentenc-
ing suggests recidivism prediction and selective incapacitation are not the primary sentenc-
ing goals, at least in the federal system").
186 [T]he narrow tailoring requirement insists that infringements of protected
rights must be necessary in order to be justified. The Supreme Court some-
times expresses essentially the same demand when it says that the govern-
ment's chosen means must be "the least restrictive alternative" that would
achieve its goals. A law would not be necessary to achieve its ends if the
government could accomplish the same result while inflicting lesser bur-
dens on protected rights.
Fallon, supra note 172, at 1326 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S.
656, 666 (2004)). If increased sentences are not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivists
from reoffending, then the government inflicts greater burdens on the double jeopardy
rights of recidivists than necessary to achieve its goal of reduced crime.
187 See supra notes 61-63.
188 Studies of convicted offenders tend to show high rates of recidivism. For example,
a Department of Justice Report of prisoners released in 1994 showed that, within three
years of their release, 46.9% were convicted of a new crime. RECIDnvqsM 1994, supra note
165, at 1; see also RECIDrViSM 1983, supra note 162, at 1 (reporting a 46.8% reconviction rate
three years after release). Although these rates are high, a majority of offenders are not
convicted of subsequent crimes. What is more, a significant proportion of offenders have
either no prior convictions or very little previous criminal history. Roberts, supra note 9, at
312.
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victions may simply result in shorter sentences for recidivists. But it
may also result in longer sentences for all, because legislatures may
respond by increasing sentences for all offenses if their recidivism en-
hancement schemes do not pass constitutional muster. But the mere
fact that the government may try to respond to increased protection
of rights in one area by being more aggressive in another does not
mean that rights ought not be protected. Moreover, both public opin-
ion 89 and current doctrine1 90 seem more protective of first-time of-
fenders than recidivists. So if increased penalties include first-time
offenders, they may face more political and judicial opposition.
The Supreme Court repeatedly asserts that the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects not only against multiple prosecutions, but also multi-
ple punishments. 191 Logic and history both suggest that the Clause
was intended to provide such protection. Yet recidivism enhance-
ments-which punish an offender a second time based on a previous
conviction-flourish. If the Double Jeopardy Clause does indeed
limit multiple punishments for the same offense, then this Article ex-
plains why it must also limit recidivism enhancements.
How, precisely, to limit recidivism enhancements in order to sat-
isfy double jeopardy principles is an open question. 192 But the first
step is recognizing that courts currently do not adequately protect
those principles.
189 See, e.g., JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETrA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND
CRIMINALJUSTICE 205 (1997) (noting that "public sentencing preferences are to a degree
influenced by criminal history information," in that survey respondents support increasing
sentences based on prior convictions); Gary Langer, Crime and Punishment: Poll Finds Ameri-
cans Forgiving of Nonviolent and First-Time Offenders, ABCNEWS.COM (Mar. 8, 2002), http://
abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/crimepunish-poll020307.html ("[T]wo-thirds
of Americans favor jail time, rather than treatment programs, for repeat drug offenders.
But for first-time drug offenders, the numbers again are reversed: Nearly nine in 10 prefer
treatment, not jail.").
190 As explained above, current Eighth Amendment doctrine seems ill-equipped to
limit punishment aimed at recidivists, see supra text accompanying notes 153-58, but it
can-at least in theory-act as a substantive check on punishment for first-time offenders,
but see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 (1991) (upholding a mandatory life sen-
tence for a first-time offender convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine).
191 See supra note 14.
192 Cf Roberts, supra note 9, at 350-51 (sketching briefly how to construct a recidivism
enhancement that was sensitive to the actual risk an offender would pose and noting the
difficulties).
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